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RELATED APPEALU.S. Security, et al. v. FTC, No. 03-6276 (10th Cir.)
-1-
JURISDICTIONOn January 29, 2003, plaintiffs U.S. Security; Chartered Benefit Services, Inc.;Global Contact Services, Inc.; Infocision Management Corp.; and Direct MarketingAssociation, Inc., (“U.S. Security plaintiffs”), and plaintiffs Mainstream MarketingServices, Inc.; TMG Marketing, Inc.; and American Teleservices Association (“Main-stream plaintiffs”) filed separate actions challenging various provisions of the Tele-marketing Sales Rule (“Rule”), which the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) prom-ulgated on January 29, 2003, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 553.  The district court’s jurisdic-tion in both cases arises from 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.Each district court entered a final judgment, enjoining or declaring invalidprovisions of the Rule creating and implementing a national do-not-call registry fortelemarketers.  This Court has jurisdiction over both appeals, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 1291.The U.S. Security judgment was entered on September 23, 2003, and the FTCfiled its notice of appeal on September 24.  The Mainstream judgment was enteredon September 25, 2003, and the FTC filed its notice of appeal on September 26.  On July 3, 2003, the FCC issued its Report and Order (“FCC Order”) adoptingrules requiring telemarketers to comply with the do-not-call registry.  A summary ofthe FCC Order was published in the Federal Register on July 25, 2003.  68 Fed. Reg.
1  Because the FCC is a respondent in Case Nos. 03-9571 & 03-9594, and theissues presented in those cases will depend to a degree on the arguments petitionersmake in their October 31, 2003, briefs, the FCC reserves the right to identify addi-tional issues in the government’s November 7, 2003, filing.-2-
44144.  The Mainstream plaintiffs filed a petition for review of the FCC Order in thisCourt the same day, and refiled their petition on August 4, 2003.  On September 23,2003, petitioner Competitive Telecommunications Association filed a petition forreview of the FCC Order in the District of Columbia Circuit, which transferred thatproceeding to this Court on October 3, 2003.  This Court has jurisdiction over bothpetitions pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 2342.STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED11. Whether the nationwide do-not-call registry jointly implemented by the FTCand the FCC violates the First Amendment rights of commercial telemarketers toplace calls to consumers who have indicated, by signing up for the registry, that theydo not want such calls.2. Whether the FTC’s Fee Rule violates the First Amendment.3. Whether the FTC had authority to promulgate those provisions of its Rulethat pertain to the do-not-call registry.
2  “JA” refers to the Joint Appendix of Appellant FTC, Respondent FCC, andRespondent-Intervenor United States. -3-
STATEMENT OF THE CASEA. Nature of the Case, the Course of Proceedings, and the Disposition BelowPlaintiff/petitioner telemarketers brought these actions challenging the FTC’sand FCC’s joint implementation of a nationwide do-not-call registry.  The FTCcreated the registry as part of its Telemarketing Sales Rule.  The Rule prohibits tele-marketers and sellers from calling phone numbers that consumers have listed on theregistry.  Subsequently, the FCC amended its rules implementing the TelephoneConsumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227, to prohibit persons from mak-ing telephone solicitations to residential telephone subscribers who have registeredtheir telephone numbers on the registry.  Since June 27, 2003, when the registryopened, consumers have registered more than 50 million phone numbers.The U.S. Security plaintiffs filed their complaint in the Western District ofOklahoma, challenging the registry on statutory and constitutional grounds.  JA 152.2The Mainstream plaintiffs raised similar challenges in the District of Colorado.  JA 8.The parties in both district court proceedings filed cross-motions for summaryjudgment.  On September 23, the court in U.S. Security (per Judge West) enteredjudgment for plaintiffs, holding that the FTC lacked authority to promulgate those
3  Both district courts upheld, against plaintiffs’ challenges, other portions ofthe FTC’s Rule, which affect telemarketing but are distinct from the do-not-callregistry. See JA 78, 184.  The U.S. Security plaintiffs have appealed from suchportions of that court’s opinion.  That appeal (No. 03-6276) is not part of thisconsolidated proceeding. -4-
provisions of the Rule that pertain to the registry.  Congress subsequently overruledthis decision by statute.  See P.L. 108-82, 117 Stat. 1006 (2003).  On September 25,2003, the court in Mainstream (per Judge Nottingham) entered judgment for plaintiffsthere, holding that the registry violated the First Amendment and enjoining the FTCfrom enforcing the rule provisions creating and implementing the registry.  OnOctober 7, 2003, this Court stayed the Mainstream decision, and the following day,granted the United States’ motion to intervene.  The Mainstream plaintiffs and the Competitive Telecommunications Associa-tion filed petitions for review of the FCC Order.  The Mainstream plaintiffs soughta stay pending appeal, which this Court denied on September 26, 2003.By orders of October 7 and 8, 2003, this Court consolidated all four of thesematters and directed the governmental parties to submit a single opening brief.  In thisconsolidated proceeding, the FTC seeks reversal of the portions of both lower courtrulings invalidating the do-not-call registry, and the dismissal of plaintiffs’ chal-lenges.3  The FCC seeks denial of both petitions for review.
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B. Facts and Proceedings Below1. BackgroundIn the past two decades, telemarketing to consumers has become a multi-billiondollar business -- and a growing intrusion into everyday life.  As early as 1991,Congress recognized that “[u]nrestricted telemarketing * * * can be an intrusiveinvasion of privacy,” and that “many consumers are outraged over the proliferationof intrusive, nuisance calls to their homes from telemarketers.”  TCPA, 47 U.S.C.§ 227 note.  Since that time, matters have only gotten worse -- the volume oftelemarketing calls, and the public outcry, have both increased.  According toinformation received in the FTC’s rulemaking record, commercial telemarketerscomplete over 16 billion calls a year.  68 Fed. Reg. at 4630 n. 591; JA 341.  The FCClikewise estimated that telemarketing calls, completed and abandoned, could amountto as many as 104 million calls a day -- a “fivefold” increase in the last decade.  FCCOrder, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014, 14054 ¶ 66 (2003), JA 894.a. The TCPA and the FCC’s Original RuleThe TCPA, enacted in 1991, directs the FCC to prescribe rules addressing “theneed to protect residential telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receivingtelephone solicitations to which they object.”  47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(1).  In adoptingsuch regulations, the FCC was to “compare and evaluate alternative methods and
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procedures (including the use of electronic databases, telephone network technolo-gies, special directory markings, industry-based or company-specific ‘do-not-call’systems * * *) for their effectiveness in protecting such privacy rights, and in termsof their costs and other advantages and disadvantages.”  47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(1)(A).The TCPA specifically authorized the FCC to “require the establishment and opera-tion of a single national database to compile a list of telephone numbers of residentialsubscribers who object to receiving telephone solicitations.”  47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(3).Under the TCPA, a “telephone solicitation” means “the initiation of a telephonecall or message for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of, or invest-ment in, property, goods, or services, which is transmitted to any person.”  47 U.S.C.§ 227(a)(3).  Besides calls to “any person with that person’s prior express permis-sion,” or “to any person with whom the caller has an established business relation-ship,” the definition of telephone solicitation does not include “a call or message* * * by a tax exempt nonprofit organization.”  Id.   The legislative history explainsthat Congress excluded tax-exempt organizations because the record before it did“not contain sufficient evidence to demonstrate that calls from [such] organizationsshould be subject to the [statute’s] restrictions.”  H.R. Rep. No. 102-317 at 16 (1991).On the contrary, “[c]omplaint statistics show[ed] that unwanted commercial calls area far bigger problem than unsolicited calls from political or charitable organizations.”
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Id.  (citing poll conducted by National Association of Consumer Agency Administra-tors).  “In addition to the relative low volume of non-commercial calls,” the HouseCommittee concluded “that such calls are less intrusive to consumers because theyare more expected.”  Id.  “Consequently,” the Committee stated, “the two mainsources of consumer problems -- high volume of solicitations and unexpected solici-tations – are not present in solicitations by nonprofit organizations.”  Id.  Nonetheless,Congress directed the FCC to “consider whether there is a need for additionalCommission authority to further restrict telephone solicitations, including those callsexempted under [the telephone solicitation definition].”  47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(1)(D).In 1992, the FCC adopted rules implementing the TCPA.  Among other things,the agency established company-specific “do-not-call” requirements, according towhich persons or companies engaged in telephone solicitation are required to create,maintain, and honor a list of residential telephone subscribers who do not wish to becalled by the telemarketer.  Rules and Regulations Implementing the TelephoneConsumer Protection Act of 1991, Report and Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 8752 ¶¶ 23-24(1992); see 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2).  The FCC decided not to create a national do-not-call database at that time, however, emphasizing that such a database “would becostly and difficult to establish and maintain in a reasonably accurate form,” and that
4  In 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act, P.L. 107-56, § 1011, expanded theTCFPA’s definition of telemarketing to encompass telemarketing by for-profitentities on behalf of charities. -8-
the company-specific do-not-call lists appeared to provide “an effective alternative.”7 FCC Rcd. 8760-61 ¶¶ 14-15. b. The TCFPA and the FTC’s Original RuleCongress passed the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse PreventionAct (“TCFPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101 et seq., in 1994.  At that time, it noted the “mag-nitude” of the problem of “[i]nterstate telemarketing fraud,” and recognized that“[c]onsumers are victimized by other forms of telemarketing deception and abuse.”15 U.S.C. § 6101.  Accordingly, Congress ordered the FTC to “prescribe rulesprohibiting deceptive telemarketing acts or practices and other abusive telemarketingacts or practices,” 15 U.S.C. § 6102(a)(1), and further directed that the FTC “shallinclude in such rules respecting other abusive telemarketing acts or practices -- arequirement that telemarketers may not undertake a pattern of unsolicited telephonecalls which the reasonable consumer would consider coercive or abusive of suchconsumer’s right to privacy,” 15 U.S.C. § 6102(a)(3)(A).  The TCFPA definedtelemarketing as “a plan, program, or campaign which is conducted to induce pur-chases of goods or services by use of one or more telephones and which involvesmore than one interstate telephone call.”  15 U.S.C. § 6106(4).4  It further provides
-9-
that “no activity which is outside the jurisdiction of [the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41et seq.] shall be affected by this Act.”  15 U.S.C. § 6105(a).The FTC promulgated its original Rule in 1995.  60 Fed. Reg. 43842.  ThatRule prohibited various deceptive telemarketing practices (16 C.F.R. § 310.3), as wellas abusive practices such as calling a consumer who has said she does not wish to becalled (the company-specific do-not-call provision).  16 C.F.R. § 310.4.  Because ofthe jurisdictional limits of the TCFPA and the FTC Act, the Rule applied only tointerstate telemarketing of goods and services, and did not apply to, inter alia, tele-marketing by nonprofits or banks, or in connection with common carrier activities.c. Amendments to the FTC’s RuleIn 2000, the FTC commenced a review of the Rule’s effectiveness, and basedon the information it gathered, it decided to consider amendments to addressrecurring abuses.  68 Fed. Reg. 4581-82.  On January 30, 2002, the FTC publishedits Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”).  67 Fed. Reg. 4492.  The FTC notedthat the Rule’s company-specific do-not-call provision had been widely criticized asinadequate to protect consumers from unwanted telemarketing calls.  Accordingly,the NPRM proposed, inter alia, the establishment of a national “do-not-call” registryfor consumers who want to limit the number of telemarketing calls they receive.   67Fed. Reg. 4516-20.
-10-
The FTC’s rulemaking elicited a remarkable outpouring of public sentiment;the FTC received over 64,000 comments, not only from potentially affected busi-nesses and organizations, but also from academics, privacy advocates, and thousandsof individual citizens.  68 Fed. Reg. 4582.  The vast majority of these commentssupported creation of the registry.  Id. at 4628.  The FTC promulgated its amendments on January 29, 2003.  See 68 Fed. Reg.4580 et seq., JA 214.  In its amended Rule, the FTC supplemented its company-specific do-not-call rules with a national do-not-call registry.  16 C.F.R.§ 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B).  The FTC noted that commenters identified a number of prob-lems with the company-specific rules.  68 Fed. Reg. at 4629.  Among other things,commenters observed that the company-specific approach is “extremely burdensome”to consumers, because it requires them to “repeat their ‘do-not-call’ request withevery telemarketer that calls.”  Id.  In addition, commenters asserted that their ‘do-not-call’ requests are ignored, that they have no way of verifying that they have beentaken off a telemarketer’s list, that private lawsuits under the TCPA are “complex andtime-consuming,” and that judgments against telemarketers are difficult to enforce.Id.  As a result of this continuing frustration with unsolicited telemarketing calls, andas further evidence that the company-specific rules had, by themselves, “proven
-11-
ineffective,” id., the FTC observed that 27 states had established statewide do-not-calllists.  Id. at 4630.   The national registry works as follows: consumers who want to reduce thenumber of telemarketing calls they receive may add their phone numbers to theregistry through either a toll-free telephone call or through the internet.  The decisionto place a number on the registry is voluntary; no consumer is required to participate,and consumers may remove their numbers at any time.  Consumers who do notparticipate in the registry remain free to invoke the Rule’s company-specific do-not-call provision to shield themselves from specific telemarketers.  Telemarketers andsellers are prohibited by the Rule from calling numbers that have been placed on theregistry (but they remain free to call consumers with whom they have an establishedbusiness relationship, or consumers who have given the seller written authorizationto call, 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B)(i), (ii)).  In order to “scrub” their phone listsof the numbers on the registry, telemarketers gain access to the registry through asecure website.  Those companies are assessed a charge based upon the number ofarea codes of data that they wish to receive.  68 Fed. Reg. 4628-41.The FTC recognized that implementation of the registry would not eliminateall telephone intrusions in the home; but it affords consumers “the prospect of at leastreducing the number of unwanted solicitations that they receive.”  68 Fed. Reg. at
5  For example, the National Association of Attorneys General reported thatmany telemarketers were imposing burdensome conditions, such as requiring writtennotice, for consumers who wished to assert their rights under the company-specificrule.  J.A. __-__. -12-
4631.  Based on its rulemaking record, the FTC determined that the registry wouldapply only to commercial telemarketers -- i.e., to calls “on behalf of sellers of goodsor services.”  68 Fed. Reg. 4629.  In reaching that conclusion, the FTC consideredcomments received in the rulemaking, as well as its enforcement experience under theoriginal Rule.  For example, one major consideration weighing in favor of implement-ing the registry was the experience of consumers and enforcers with the company-specific do-not-call provision, which had applied to commercial telemarketers forseveral years.  The record reflected great public dissatisfaction with that provision asa protection of residential privacy, in light of telemarketers’ failure to abide byconsumers’ requests not to be called, as well as the burden on consumers due to thelarge number of commercial pitches.  Id. at 4629-31.5Not surprisingly, there were no similar reports of dissatisfaction with respectto noncommercial telemarketing, since the Rule did not address such calls until 2003.The FTC also concluded, based on comments received, “that fundamental differencesbetween commercial solicitations and charitable solicitations may confer upon thecompany-specific “do-not-call” requirements a greater measure of success with
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respect to preventing a pattern of abusive calls” on behalf of charities.  Id. at 4637;see JA 360-61.  Moreover, the FTC considered arguments that charitable solicitationsare often combined with fully-protected advocacy, which could be entitled to agreater degree of First Amendment protection.  68 Fed. Reg. at 4634-36; see JA 347-38.  On the other hand, the FTC recognized that even charitable solicitations caninterfere with residential peace, and therefore rejected some charities’ assertions “thatno privacy protection measures are necessary with respect to charitable solicitationtelemarketing.”  68 Fed. Reg. at 4637.  Accordingly, the FTC made charitablesolicitation by entities within its jurisdiction subject to the company-specific do-not-call requirement -- i.e., charitable solicitation performed by for-profit telemarketersis subject to this provision, while the activities of non-profit, charitable entitiesthemselves remain outside the FTC’s jurisdiction.  See 15 U.S.C. § 44.  The FTC alsosaid it would monitor future experience and would revisit the issue if it appeared thatthe company-specific rule was not adequately protecting consumer privacy withrespect to noncommercial solicitations.  Id.Shortly after the FTC promulgated its amendments, Congress passed twopieces of legislation intended to assist in the implementation of the registry.  OnFebruary 20, 2003, it passed the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003.  P.L.108-7.  This legislation allowed the FTC to use up to $18.1 million derived from “fees
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sufficient to implement and enforce the do-not-call provisions of the TelemarketingSales Rule.”  117 Stat. 96.  On March 11, 2003, Congress enacted the Do-Not-CallImplementation Act (“DNCIA”),  P.L. 108-10, authorizing the FTC to collect fees“sufficient to implement and enforce the provisions relating to the ‘do-not-call’registry of the Telemarketing Sales Rule.”  117 Stat. 557.As a result of the DNCIA, the FTC promulgated its Fee Rule, 68 Fed. Reg.45134 (July 31, 2003), which establishes the fees that a telemarketer or seller mustpay to access the registry.  The Fee Rule provides for a charge of $25 per area code,with a maximum fee of $7375.  It also provides that the first five area codes of dataare free to any entity.  68 Fed. Reg. 45144.  Once an entity pays the fee, it may accessthe registry for a period of 12 months.  Id.  Entities (such as charities) that are notrequired to comply with the registry but nonetheless choose to do so may access theregistry free of charge.  Id.The FTC began accepting sign-ups for the registry on June 27, 2003.  Within72 hours, consumers had enrolled more than 10 million phone numbers.  See FTCpress release, June 30, 2003 (http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/06/dncregistration.htm.).Enrollment has continued at a steady pace, and consumers have now registered morethan 50 million numbers.  On September 2, 2003, the FTC began allowing telemarket-ers and sellers to purchase access to the list.
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d. Amendments to the FCC’s RuleAt the same time that the FTC was amending its Rule, the FCC invitedcomments on whether its rules should be revised to carry out more effectively thepurposes of the TCPA in light of significant changes in the telemarketing industry.See Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of1991, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17 FCCRcd. 17459, 17460-61 ¶ 1 (2002).   The FCC specifically sought comment on “theeffectiveness of company-specific do-not-call lists,” as well as “whether to revisit theoption of establishing a national do-not-call list, and, if so, how such an action mightbe taken in conjunction with the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) proposal toadopt a national do-not-call list * * *.”  Id. at 17461.  The FCC received thousandsof comments expressing widespread consumer frustration with telemarketing calls,the overwhelming majority of which supported the creation of a national do-not-callregistry.  18 FCC Rcd. 14017 ¶ 2; 14054 ¶ 66.The DNCIA directed the FCC to issue its final revised do-not-call rules within180 days, after “consult[ing] and coordinat[ing] with the Federal Trade Commissionto maximize consistency with” the FTC’s rule.  P.L. 108-10, § 3, 117 Stat. 557.  OnJuly 3, 2003, the FCC released its Report and Order revising its telemarketing rulesand established, with the FTC, a national do-not-call registry to supplement its
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existing company-specific do-not-call rules.  See 18 FCC Rcd. 14017 ¶ 1.   The FCCdetermined that, in the decade since the passage of the TCPA, there had beensignificant changes in the telemarketing industry, including a substantial rise in thenumber of telemarketing calls and a proliferation in the use of computerizedpredictive dialers.  Id. at 14017 ¶ 2.  The FCC also noted “the burdens of making do-not-call requests for every [telemarketing] call, particularly on the elderly andindividuals with disabilities.”  Id. at 14030 ¶ 19; 14054, ¶ 66.  The FCC accordinglyadopted a national do-not-call registry.  Id. at 14034 ¶ 28.  In doing so, the FCCemphasized that the registry “will only apply to outbound telemarketing calls and willonly include the telephone numbers of consumers who indicate that they wish toavoid such calls,” and that “[c]onsumers who want to receive such calls may insteadcontinue to rely on the company-specific do-not-call lists to manage telemarketingcalls into their homes.”  Id. at 14018 ¶ 3.  Like the FTC, the FCC concluded that anational do-not-call registry is consistent with the First Amendment, see id. at 14052¶ 63, and that the “registry regulations may apply to commercial solicitations withoutapplying to tax-exempt nonprofit solicitations.”  Id. at 14059 ¶ 73.
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2. Proceedings belowa. U.S. Security v. FTCThe U.S. Security plaintiffs filed their complaint in the Western District ofOklahoma on January 29, 2003.  They alleged that the do-not-call registry was out-side the FTC’s statutory authority, was arbitrary and capricious, and violated the Firstand Fifth Amendments.  The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.On September 23, 2003, the court held that the FTC lacked authority to prom-ulgate the registry.  U.S. Security Order at 11.  Because the TCPA granted the FCCspecific authority to create a registry, the court was unwilling to find such authorityin the TCFPA’s prohibition of abusive practices.  U.S. Security Order at 12.  Thecourt also held that the neither the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution nor theDNCIA ratified the registry.  U.S. Security Order at 14.  On September 24, the FTCfiled its notice of appeal and a motion for stay pending appeal, which the district courtdenied.In response to U.S. Security, Congress passed P.L. 108-82, expressly con-firming the FTC’s statutory authority to promulgate the do-not-call registry and“ratif[ying]” the FTC’s do-not-call regulation.  The President signed that legislationinto law on September 29, 2003.
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b. Mainstream Marketing v. FTCThe Mainstream plaintiffs filed their complaint in the District of Colorado onJanuary 29, 2003.  They alleged that the do-not-call registry was outside the FTC’sstatutory authority, was arbitrary and capricious, and violated the First and FifthAmendments.  The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  After the FTCpromulgated the Fee Rule, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, alleging that the FeeRule was also unconstitutional, and the parties briefed that issue.On September 25, 2003, the district court granted the plaintiffs’ summaryjudgment regarding the registry.  The court held that the provisions of the Rule thatcreate and implement the registry violate the First Amendment and enjoined the FTCfrom enforcing them.  The court acknowledged that the Rule does not directly banspeech but merely provides “a mechanism by which the individual can choose to banall commercial telemarketing calls to his residence.”  Mainstream Order at 16.  It alsorecognized that the governmental interests underlying the registry provisions aresubstantial, noting that protection of the right to residential privacy is “of the highestorder in a free and civilized society.”  Id. at 19-20.  Nevertheless, the courtcondemned the registry as imposing “a content-based limitation on what theconsumer may ban from his home” because it exempts charitable solicitors.  Id. at 18.Applying the commercial speech standard of Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
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Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), the court concluded  that theregistry failed the portion of that standard that requires restrictions on commercialspeech to advance the government’s interests to a material degree.  Mainstream Orderat 21-27.  The court assumed that the registry would “eliminate anywhere from fortyto sixty percent of all telemarketing calls for those who subscribe” (id. at 21-22), but,relying on Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993), ruled itunconstitutional because it does not apply to noncommercial solicitations.Mainstream Order at 25-27.On September 26, 2003, the FTC filed a notice of appeal and a motion in thedistrict court for an emergency stay of the injunction pending appeal, which that courtdenied on September 29.3.  Proceedings in this CourtWhile the summary judgment proceedings were pending in the district courtlawsuits against the FTC, the Mainstream plaintiffs also filed a petition for review ofthe FCC’s Order in this Court.  On August 28, after unsuccessfully seeking a staypending appeal from the agency, see 68 Fed. Reg. 49480, they filed a motion in thisCourt for a stay pending appeal.  On September 26, 2003, this Court denied the staymotion, emphasizing “the public interest in respecting ‘residential privacy,’” “thestrong expectation interest of the many millions of Americans who have registered
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with the FCC’s ‘do not call’ list,” and petitioners’ failure to establish a substantiallikelihood of success on the merits.”  Sept. 26 Order, at 3.  On September 29, 2003,the Mainstream petitioners filed an application in the Supreme Court for a staypending resolution of their petition for review.  Mainstream Marketing Serv., Inc. v.FCC, Application No. 03-A298.  The application was referred to Circuit JusticeBreyer, who denied it that day.  Accordingly, the FCC’s do-not-call rules took effecton October 1, 2003.On September 30, 2003, the FTC filed in its Mainstream appeal an emergencystay motion in this Court.  On October 7, this Court issued an Order granting the stayand holding that the FTC was likely to succeed on the merits.  10th Cir. Order,10/7/03, at 15-21.  This Court considered the legislative history of the TCPA, whichindicated that unwanted commercial calls are a far greater problem than noncommer-cial calls, and that noncommercial calls were more expected and less intrusive.  Id.at 16.  It also noted that the FTC had evidence that the company-specific provisionwas inadequate to protect consumers from commercial telemarketers, but that differ-ences between commercial and noncommercial telemarketers made the provisionmore likely to succeed with respect to noncommercial telemarketers.  Id. at 19-20.This Court observed that it is permissible for the FTC to fix a problem as to which ithas evidence without waiting for evidence with respect to noncommercial telemarket-
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ers.  Id. at 22.  Finally, this Court found it significant that the registry allows con-sumers to “opt-in,” id. at 22, and that the registry would cover “the preponderantsource of the problem * * *,” id. at 23.  As a result, this Court found that the linedrawn by the Rule was not based solely on the lesser degree of scrutiny applied tocommercial speech, and that the FTC was substantially likely to show a reasonablefit satisfying the Central Hudson test.  Id. at 22-23.SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTIn response to public outcry over the proliferation of unwanted commercialtelemarketing, Congress passed the TCPA and the TCFPA to protect privacy and toshield consumers from abusive telemarketing.  Pursuant to these statutes, the FCCand the FTC promulgated regulations mandating that commercial telemarketersmaintain company-specific do-not-call registries.  When these failed to provideadequate protection from unwanted telemarketing, both agencies established anationwide do-not-call registry for commercial telemarketers.  The registry does notban telemarketing; it creates a mechanism akin to a “NO SOLICITORS” sign where-by consumers may indicate that they do not want any further unsolicited commercialtelemarketing calls.  (Part I.A.)The registry is a reasonable regulation that easily passes the Central Hudsontest.  The interests the registry seeks to protect are of the highest order -- protecting
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the privacy of the home, and shielding consumers from unwanted communications.The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the importance of protecting privacyat home and has held that this outweighs any intruder’s interest in communication.The Court has separately recognized the right of the individual to be free from acommunication she does not want to hear.  In the words of the Court, “no one has theright to press even ‘good’ ideas on to an unwilling recipient.”   Rowan v. UnitedStates Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970).  (Part I.B.1.)The registry passes the second part of the Central Hudson test because the harmat issue is real and the registry materially advances the government’s interest in pre-venting that harm.  The agencies’ rulemaking records illustrate the striking increasein the number of unwanted telemarketing calls and the corresponding increase inconsumer frustration generated by those calls.  The records also show the failure ofcompany specific do-not-call provisions to protect consumer privacy from unwantedcommercial telemarketing.  The nationwide do-not-call registry, however, will direct-ly and materially advance the government’s interests.  The registry only applies toconsumers who sign up, and every consumer who signs up indicates that commercialtelemarketing calls are unwanted.  Accordingly, the registry only blocks unwantedcalls.  Regardless of the existence of exceptions, there is no dispute that signing up
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for the registry will shield consumers from a substantial amount of unsolicited tele-marketing.  (Part I.B.2.)The registry satisfies the third part of Central Hudson because it does notrestrict more speech than necessary to serve the government’s interests.  Like theregulation at issue in Rowan, the registry is well tailored to the government’s interestsbecause consumers, not the government, make the choice to sign up.  Further, theregistry is firmly grounded on the government’s experience with the company-specific do-not-call requirements, which had proved insufficient to protect consumersfrom unwanted commercial telemarketing.  None of the alternatives that have beensuggested would provide consumers with anywhere near the same degree of protec-tion from unwanted telemarketing.  (Part I.B.3.)The registry is not rendered unconstitutional merely because it does not applyto charitable solicitation.  The district court in Mainstream held that the registry wasunconstitutional because it exempted such solicitation, but that conclusion was basedon a misreading of both the pertinent law and the legislative and rulemaking record.The regulation at issue in Discovery Network, on which the court below relied,applied to newsracks in public spaces and achieved only a minute benefit.  Moreover,the distinction that the regulation drew between commercial and noncommercialspeech had no relationship whatsoever to the interest the regulation was intended to
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further.  The do-not-call registry, on the other hand, makes substantial progresstoward the government’s goals of protecting residential privacy, and the record estab-lishes distinctions between commercial telemarketing and noncommercial solicitationthat are related to the government’s interests -- most unwanted telephone solicitationsare commercial, the government has tried other means to protect consumers (thecompany-specific provisions), those means are more likely to work with respect tocharitable solicitation, and noncommercial calls are less intrusive to consumers.Given these distinctions, it was wholly appropriate for the government to recognizethe differential constitutional treatment accorded commercial and noncommercialspeech and to exempt noncommercial solicitation from the registry.  (Part I.B.4.)There is nothing unconstitutional about the modest fees that the FTC assessestelemarketers for access to the registry.  These fees offset the costs of the registry, andof enforcing the do-not-call and other provisions of the TCFPA.  There is noconstitutional impediment to collecting fees that meet the costs of administering theFTC’s regulation.  (Part II.)The court’s conclusion in U.S. Security that the FTC lacked statutory authorityto create the do-not-call registry also fails.  Two agencies may both have jurisdictionwith respect to a portion of the economy.  In any event, the court’s decision was
6  Federal agency rules may be set aside only if “arbitrary, capricious, an abuseof discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).  Thatstandard is “narrow” and “a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of theagency.”  Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463U.S. 29, 43 (1983).  This Court reviews the grant of summary judgment, includingissues regarding the constitutionality of statutes and rules, de novo.  Hoffman-Pughv. Keenan, 338 F.3d 1136, 1138-39 (10th Cir. 2003).-25-
overruled by an act of Congress, which recognized that the FTC had ample authorityto create the registry, and which ratified the registry the FTC created.  (Part III.)ARGUMENTI.  THE DO-NOT-CALL REGISTRY IS CONSTITUTIONAL6A. Congress And The Agencies Have Taken MeasuredSteps To Preserve Residential PrivacyAt bottom, this case involves “‘the most comprehensive of rights and the rightmost valued by civilized men’”-- i.e., the “‘right to be left alone.’” Hill v. Colorado,530 U.S. 703, 716-17 (2000) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).  Faced with new challenges to that right engen-dered by new technology and aggressive business practices, Congress, the FTC, andthe FCC have taken a series of measured steps, based on continuing experience, toenable consumers to preserve privacy in their homes.  Congress began in 1991 withthe TCPA, which authorized the FCC to adopt rules “concerning the need to protectresidential telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicita-
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tions to which they object,” 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(1), including rules requiring the useof a “national database * * * of residential subscribers who object to receiving tele-phone solicitations.”  47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(3).  The TCPA defines “telephone solici-tation” to exclude, among other things, “a call or message * * * by a tax exemptnonprofit organization.”  47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3)(C).  As the Eighth Circuit recognizedin Missouri v. American Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2003), that exclusionreadily passes constitutional muster, for it is based on a record before Congressshowing that “most unwanted telephone solicitations are commercial in nature,” andthat noncommercial solicitations “are less intrusive to consumers because they aremore expected.”  Id. at 655; H.R. Rep. No. 102-317 at 16.Three years later, in the TCFPA, Congress authorized the FTC to adopt rules“prohibiting * * * abusive telemarketing acts or practices,” including any “pattern ofunsolicited telephone calls which the reasonable consumer would consider coerciveor abusive of such consumer’s right to privacy.”  15 U.S.C. §§ 6102(a)(1), (a)(3)(A).In the DNCIA, Congress directed the FCC to issues rules under the TCPA that would“maximize consistency” with the FTC’s do-not-call registry rules, and authorized theFTC to adopt rules establishing fees for the registry.Pursuant to these statutes, the FTC and the FCC have promulgated rulesestablishing and implementing a national “do-not-call” registry, through which
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consumers can register their residential telephone numbers to indicate their desire notto be called by commercial telemarketers.  16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii); 47 C.F.R.§ 64.1200(c)(2).  The registry rules “supplement” the pre-existing company-specificdo-not-call rules, which prohibit telemarketers from calling a consumer who haspreviously asked not to be called.  68 Fed. Reg. at 4629; 18 FCC Rcd. 14017 ¶ 1.Under these regulations, consumers have “a variety of options for managingtelemarketing calls.”  18 FCC Rcd.  14033 ¶ 26.  They may “(1) place their numberon the national do-not-call list; (2) continue to make do-not-call requests of individualcompanies on a case-by-case basis; and/or (3) register on the national list, but providespecific companies with express permission to call them.”  Id.   The agencies adopted a national do-not-call registry because the consumerfrustration with unsolicited telemarketing calls had continued unabated in the face oftheir company-specific rules, and despite the establishment of a number of statewidedo-not-call registries as well as the self-regulatory efforts of the telemarketing indus-try.  68 Fed. Reg. at 4630; 18 FCC Rcd. 14017 ¶ 2.  As the FCC explained, “[t]hetelephone network is the primary means for many consumers to remain in contactwith public safety organizations and family members during times of illness andemergency,” yet “[c]onsumer frustration with telemarketing practices has reached apoint in which many consumers no longer answer their telephones while others
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disconnect their phones during some hours of the day to maintain their privacy.”  Id.at 14035, ¶ 29.  Particularly in light of the substantial increase in telemarketing calls in recentyears, the company-specific rules imposed a considerable burden on consumers, sincethey “must repeat their ‘do-not-call’ request with every telemarketer that calls.”  68Fed. Reg. at 4629; 18 FCC Rcd. 14030 ¶ 19.  Moreover, the use of computerizedpredictive dialers has led to an increase in “dead-air” or hang-up calls.  Not only aremany consumers frightened by such calls, but consumers have no practical ability toinvoke their company-specific do-not-call rights when the telemarketer does notremain on the line.  18 FCC Rcd. 14030, 14035 ¶¶ 19, 28.  Many telemarketers alsolack the equipment necessary to receive a do-not-call request by persons with disabi-lities.  Id. at 14035-36, ¶ 29.  See generally 18 FCC Rcd. 14066 ¶ 87, 14067-68 ¶ 91.The do-not-call rules do not “ban telemarketing calls,” but instead “provide amechanism by which individual consumers may choose not to receive telemarketingcalls.”  18 FCC Rcd.  14057 ¶ 71.  And while there are “many other ways availableto market products to consumers, such as newspapers, television, radio advertisingand direct mail,” the agencies concluded that “there simply are not ‘numerous andobvious less-burdensome alternatives’ to the national do-not-call registry.”  Id.Indeed, although the telemarketing industry “fears the economic impact a national
7  The FCC’s do-not-call registry rules apply to “telephone solicitations,”defined as “the initiation of a telephone call or message for the purpose of encourag-ing the purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or services * * *.”47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(9).  The FTC’s registry similarlyapplies to “outbound telemarketing calls to induce the purchase of goods or services.”16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii).  The telemarketing calls covered by the registry thus“fit[] soundly within the definition of commercial speech.”  U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC,182 F.3d 1224, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 1999).-29-
registry might have,” the registry “might actually benefit industry,” as the FTCpointed out, “because telemarketers would reduce time spent calling consumers whodo not want to receive telemarketing calls and would be able to focus their calls onlyon those who do not object to such calls.”  68 Fed. Reg. at 4632.B. The Do-Not-Call Registry Is A ReasonableRegulation Of Commercial SpeechThe government has the power to regulate even nondeceptive commercialspeech7  if (1) its interest in doing so is “substantial,” and  the regulation it proposesboth (2) “directly advances” that interest, and (3) “is not more extensive than is neces-sary to serve that interest.”  Central Hudson , 447 U.S. at 566.  Under this test, thegovernment must show, not that its regulation will effect a complete cure, but that itwill alleviate identified harms to a “material degree.”  Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,515 U.S. 618, 626 (1995).  In regulating commercial speech, the government is notrequired to employ the least restrictive means of advancing its interests; it is sufficientthat there is a “reasonable fit” between means and ends -- “a fit that is not necessarily
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perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition butone whose scope is ‘in proportion to the interest served.’” Board of Trustees of StateUniv. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (citation omitted).  “Withinthose bounds we leave it to governmental decisionmakers to judge what manner ofregulation may best be employed.”  Id.Perhaps the most striking feature of the do-not-call registry is that it bans nospeech directly, but merely allows individual households to exercise the right “to beleft alone,” by barring from their own homes speech by others that they do not wishto hear.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the strength of that interest,which “must be placed on the scales with the right of others to communicate.”Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970); see Frisby v.Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988); Hill v. Colorado, supra.  As explained below, thiskey feature of the registry affects every aspect of the Central Hudson analysis, andcompels a conclusion that the registry is a modest and reasonable restriction oncommercial speech.1. The Interests The Registry Seeks To Advance Are SubstantialThe interests that Congress and the agencies seek to advance here are of thehighest order -- protecting consumers’ homes from intrusion, and shielding them fromunwanted commercial communication.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed
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that the government’s interest “‘in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacyof the home’” is “‘certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society.’”Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. at 484 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471(1980)).  As the Court explained in Carey, the home is “the one retreat to which menand women can repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits.”  447U.S. at 471.  The Court has emphasized that the Constitution does not leave govern-mental units “powerless to pass laws to protect the public from * * * conduct thatdisturbs the tranquility of [the] home[ ]* * *.”  Carey, 447 U.S. at 470-71 (quotingGregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 118 (1969) (Black, J., concurring)).  Indeed, theCourt has made plain that “the individual’s right to be left alone [in the privacy of hishome] plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder.”  FCC v. PacificaFound., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978).  “[T]he privacy of the home * * * is accordedspecial consideration in our Constitution, laws, and traditions.”  Department ofDefense v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487, 501 (1994).Moreover, the do-not-call registry is aimed at an especially important elementof residential privacy, the protection from direct interruption of home and family life.As one court observed in upholding a state law barring commercial messages sent byautomated dialing devices, “[t]he telephone is unique in its capacity to bring thoseoutside the home into the home for direct verbal interchange -- in short, the residen-
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tial telephone is uniquely intrusive.”  State v. Casino Marketing Group, 491 N.W. 2d882, 888 (Minn. 1992).  Unlike other media, the telephone generally demands imme-diate attention, lest important personal or emergency messages be missed.  Id.  Asdiscussed above, moreover, the legislative history of the pertinent statutes and therulemaking records before both agencies demonstrate the onslaught against this coreprivacy interest that billions of commercial telemarketing calls have engendered.  SeeVan Bergen v. Minnesota, 59 F.3d 1541, 1555 (8th Cir. 1995) (“The sheer volume oftelemarketing calls further supports the government’s interest in regulation protectingprivacy.”).  Accordingly, there can be no question here that the government hasarticulated a privacy interest of the strongest sort.There is also a distinct interest, repeatedly recognized by the Supreme Court,of a would-be listener to refrain from accepting unwanted communications.  “[I]ndi-viduals are not required to welcome unwanted speech into their own homes and thegovernment may protect this freedom.”  Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. at 485; seeEdenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 769 (1993) (protecting consumers from unwantedsolicitation); Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 625 (same); Bland v. Fessler, 88 F.3d 729, 734(9th Cir. 1996) (state has significant interest in protecting consumers from unwantedtelephone solicitation).  The Court has “continued to maintain that ‘no one has the
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right to press even “good” ideas on an unwilling recipient.’” Hill v. Colorado, 530U.S. at 718 (quoting Rowan, 397 U.S. at 738).Indeed, one of these cases -- Rowan -- is particularly relevant to the issues athand.  There, the Supreme Court upheld against a First Amendment challenge a fed-eral statute that allowed homeowners to shield themselves from any “advertisement”offering for sale matter that the recipient “believe[d] to be erotically arousing orsexually provocative.”  397 U.S. at 730.  Under the statute, the recipient could requestthe Postmaster General to order the sender of the advertisement to cease furthermailings and remove the recipient from the sender’s mailing lists.  39 U.S.C. § 4009(1964 Supp. IV).  The Court explained that “[n]othing in the Constitution compels usto listen to or view any unwanted communication, whatever its merit.”  397 U.S. at737.  The Court “therefore categorically reject[ed] the argument that a vendor has theright under the Constitution or otherwise to send unwanted material into the home ofanother.”  Id. at 738.  The Court concluded that “[t]he asserted right of” a personseeking to communicate with another “stops at the outer door of [that other] person’sdomain.”  Id.Like the statute upheld in Rowan, the do-not-call registry serves the importantpublic interest of facilitating the homeowner’s right to block unwanted communica-
8  Indeed, consumers have a greater need for the registry than for the statute inRowan because, although the “short, though regular, journey from mail box to trashcan,” see Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983), may shieldagainst unwanted mailings, there is no such simple solution to the intrusion oftelephone solicitation. -34-
tions about commercial matters from the home.8  The rationale for the Court’s deci-sion in Rowan applies as well to the registry.  Consumers who have voluntarily addedtheir numbers to the do-not-call registry have shown that they desire to receive nocommercial telephone solicitations at their homes.  The do-not-call registry serves theimportant interest of effectuating that desire.2. The Registry Materially Advances ThePrivacy Interests At StakeThe registry passes the second part of the Central Hudson test because “theharms [the government] recites are real and * * * its restriction will in fact alleviatethem to a material degree.”  See Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 626.  There can be no dis-pute that the harm caused by unwanted telemarketing is real.  As discussed above, therulemaking records before both agencies reflected the dramatically growing numberof intrusions from commercial telemarketing, and the outpouring of public desire toprotect the sanctity of the home from such intrusions.  It is clear from the vastmajority of the thousands of comments that both agencies received during theirrulemakings in support of the registry (68 Fed. Reg. 4630 n.593; 18 FCC Rcd. 14054
9  During the rulemaking, “[i]ndividual sellers and telemarketing firms esti-mated that they might have to lay off up to 50 percent of their employees if such aregistry were to go into effect.”  68 Fed. Reg. 4631.  Such a reduction in employmentwould lead to a corresponding reduction in telemarketing calls.  This provides a basisfor the estimate, referred to by the court, that the registry would put a halt to 40 to 60percent of telemarketing calls.  See Mainstream Order at 22; Mainstream Stay Orderat 4. -35-
¶ 66), and from the more than 50 million registrations the FTC has already received,that consumers perceive great harm in the roughly 16 billion commercial telemarket-ing calls they receive each year.  See Anderson v. Treadwell, 294 F.3d 453, 462 (2dCir. 2002) (the popularity of the government’s program demonstrated that the harmwas real, and that the program would alleviate the harm). Nor is there any dispute that the registry will advance the government’sinterest.  The registry does not seek, after all, to eliminate all telephone calls.  Rather,the rulemaking record shows that consumers greatly value “the prospect of at leastreducing the number of unwanted telephone solicitations that they receive.”  68 Fed.Reg. at 4631.  Although the record does not contain evidence as to the precise per-centage of telemarketing calls that the registry would eliminate, there is record evi-dence to support the Mainstream court’s conclusion that the registry as initiallyproposed by the FTC would apply to 40 to 60 percent of telemarketing calls.9  As theFCC noted, “[t]he history of state-administered do-not-call lists demonstrates thatsuch do-not-call programs have a positive impact on the ability of many consumers
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to protect their privacy by reducing the number of unwanted telephone solicitationsthat they receive each day.”  18 FCC Rcd. 14054 ¶ 67.  See also id. at 14030 ¶ 20(“[m]any consumers indicate that their state lists have reduced the number ofunwanted calls that they receive”).  Moreover, the district court’s conclusion did notreflect the impact of the FCC’s rule, which fills substantial gaps in the FTC’s juris-diction, by covering intrastate telemarketing as well as telemarketing by banks andcommon carriers.  Thus, the registry will alleviate the relevant harm to a substantialdegree.  See United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 434 (1993)(upholding a restriction on offending ads that applied only to a radio station thataccounted for 11 percent of listening time in the affected area); Missouri v. AmericanBlast Fax, Inc., supra (finding no First Amendment violation in TCPA provision thatprohibited unsolicited fax advertising, but not noncommercial faxes); compareCincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. at 417-18 (faulting city’s ordinancethat would eliminate only 3 to 4 percent of the offending newsracks).  In any event,there is no constitutional requirement that the government “make progress on everyfront before it can make progress on any front.”  Edge, 509 U.S. at 434.Here, consumers beleaguered by repeated telemarketing calls will derive directand concrete relief if they invoke the do-not-call registry, even if some exempt enti-ties can continue to call.  Moreover, because the communicative act itself (i.e., the
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telemarketing call) causes the intrusion on consumer privacy, restricting such callsis plainly the most direct means of furthering privacy protection.  See Trans UnionCorp. v. FTC, 267 F.3d 1138, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (recognizing the directness ofbenefit where “the speech itself * * * causes the very harm the government seeks toprevent”); Anderson v. Treadwell, 294 F.3d at 462 (resident-activated restriction iscoextensive with the harm it is designed to alleviate).The efficacy of the agencies’ rules in furthering the privacy interests at stakeis also apparent from the legislative and rulemaking record behind their adoption.  Asexplained above, the do-not-call registry grew out of the agencies’ enforcementexperience regarding their company-specific do-not-call rules.  Since 1992, the FCC’srule, and since 1995, the FTC’s rule, have both contained such provisions.  See 16C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(A); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d).  Due to limits upon the FTC’sand the FCC’s statutory jurisdiction (not “illogical distinctions” made by the agen-cies,  see Mainstream Stay Order at 12), those provisions applied only to commercialtelemarketers.  16 U.S.C. § 6106(4); 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3).  Evidence collected dur-ing both agencies’ rulemakings showed that commercial telemarketers ignoredconsumers’ requests to be put on company-specific lists, or even hampered consum-ers’ efforts to be placed on such lists.  68 Fed. Reg. 4628-29; 18 FCC Rcd. 14030¶ 19.  As a result, the agencies had evidence that the company-specific provisions
10  Although the Mainstream court’s Stay Order called this a “newly devisedjustification,” see Stay Order at 10, JA 128, the FTC had discussed this in its State-ment of Basis and Purpose for the Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4637, and presented theargument to the court in its cross-motion for summary judgment.-38-
simply did not work to shield consumers from unwanted telemarketing placed bycommercial telemarketers.  Implementation of the registry, however, will effectivelyaddress this failing in the preexisting regulation of commercial telemarketing, bygiving consumers the added option of declining all such communications if they sochoose.The telemarketers have faulted the agencies for not extending the registry tocharitable telemarketing.  But they ignore the fact that the government has no evi-dence that charities will flout the company-specific provision, because neither rulehas, until recently, applied to telemarketing on behalf of charities.10  As discussedabove, moreover, the legislative record before Congress showed that commercialtelemarketing constituted a recognized intrusion and a source of widespread publicdissatisfaction.  In such circumstances, Congress and implementing agencies areamply justified in efforts to “make progress on [one] front.”  Edge Broadcasting, 509U.S. at 434; see 10th Cir. Order, 10/7/03, at 19 n.7 (“that the FTC did not yet have arecord as to the need to include charitable callers on a national do-not-call list doesnot mean that it could not at least address the problem as to which it did have an
11  Indeed, the situation in Rowan was similar in this regard.  There, Congressacted “in response to public * * * concern with the use of mail facilities to distributeunsolicited advertisements that recipients found to be offensive * * *.”  397 U.S. at731-32.  Information developed at hearings established the seriousness of the prob-lem.  Id.  Under such circumstances, it was proper for Congress to deal with theproblem as identified -- through the carefully tailored means of facilitating consumerchoice about receiving telemarketing -- regardless of whether other categories ofcommunications might pose similar concerns.-39-
adequate record * * *.”).11  Further, as the FTC pointed out, it could revisit the issueif further experience proves the company-specific approach inadequate to deterabuses in the context of charitable solicitation. 68 Fed. Reg. at 4637.3. The Minimal Restrictions On Commercial Speech The Registry Imposes Are No More Extensive Than NecessaryThe final element of the Central Hudson test, which also relates to the “fit”between the interests Congress and the agencies seek to advance and the means cho-sen, is whether the registry is “more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.” 447 U.S. at 566.  As the Supreme Court has emphasized, in regulating commercialspeech, Congress need not employ the “least restrictive means.”  Fox, 492 U.S. at480-81.  The relevant inquiry is “whether the speech restriction is not more extensivethan necessary to serve the interests that support it.”  Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001).  And, as with the prior element, the fit need not be perfector even the best possible fit,  because, “[w]ithin the bounds of the general protection
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provided by the Constitution to commercial speech [the courts] allow room for legis-lative judgments.”  10th Cir. Order, 10/7/03, at 7 (quoting Edge, 509 U.S. at 434).a.  In fact, the do-not-call registry is extraordinarily well-tailored to imposeonly minimal restrictions on speech, because -- unlike most provisions that regulatecommercial speech -- the FTC and FCC rules do not themselves ban any speech, butsimply allow consumers to “opt in” to a list that shields them from telemarketing callsplaced by commercial telemarketers.  10th Cir. Order, 10/7/03, at 22.  Consumers, notthe government, make the choice to limit the calls that intrude into their living rooms.Such an approach is substantially less restrictive than the alternative of barring solici-tations unless consumers affirmatively assent to accept them, as some commentershad suggested.  See 68 Fed. Reg. at 4629; 18 FCC Rcd. 14040 ¶ 37; Anderson v.Treadwell, 294 F.3d at 462; cf. U.S. West  182 F.3d at 1238-39 (noting significanceof difference between opt-in and opt-out approaches in assessing narrow tailoringunder Central Hudson).In this respect, the present case is much like Rowan, in which the SupremeCourt upheld a statute that similarly allowed householders to indicate their desire notto receive certain commercial speech -- advertisements that the recipient considered“erotically arousing or sexually provocative.”  There the Court stressed that, for therange of materials covered by the statute, there was no First Amendment problem
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because of the “absoluteness of the citizen’s right” to decide which sender’s materialswere offensive, and the “finality” of the consumer’s judgment.  397 U.S. at 737.  Thedo-not-call registry similarly puts the decision-making power unequivocally in thehands of individual consumers.The Mainstream court purported to distinguish Rowan on the ground that, “inRowan, the individual had complete autonomy to prevent any chosen material fromentering his home,” and “[t]he government’s regulation had no bearing on hischoice.”  Order at 18.  That purported distinction is, however, based on the court’smisreading of the statute in Rowan.  Contrary to the court’s apparent belief, the indi-vidual had no authority under § 4009 to prevent material from entering his homeunless he had received an advertisement, and the sender could not be sanctioned untilthe Postmaster General determined, in “an administrative hearing,” “whether theinitial material mailed to the addressee was an advertisement.”  397 U.S. at 738-739.Thus, although the homeowner had “unlimited” power to determine whether theadvertisement was objectionable, id., the homeowner did not have “complete autono-my to prevent any chosen material from entering his home.”  See Mainstream Orderat 18 (emphasis added).  The homeowner only had autonomy to exclude commercialmaterial, and that limit on the homeowner’s choice was imposed by the statute thatthe Court upheld.  See United States Postal Service v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 630
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F. Supp. 867 (D.D.C. 1986) (holding that the statute at issue in Rowan could not beconstitutionally applied to block the publisher of Hustler magazine from mailing themagazine to members of Congress, where the publisher claimed he was petitioninggovernment).  The registry has the same limitation -- it blocks only commercialtelemarketing calls.b.  As discussed above, moreover, the do-not-call registry is an outgrowth ofthe agencies’ experience with company-specific do-not-call lists.  The registry iscarefully tailored to work in tandem with such lists, to provide consumers withchoices while allowing solicitors to contact persons who have chosen not to placetheir numbers in the registry.  Advertisers thus remain free to contact willing listen-ers– only the unwilling listener is placed off-limits.Indeed, the FTC’s and the FCC’s rules give consumers a nuanced menu ofchoices.  Consumers may enroll on the registry, thereby halting all commercial tele-marketing.  But the rules also allow consumers to tailor the impact of registration.A consumer who has registered may nonetheless authorize a particular telemarketerto make calls.  See 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B)(i); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2)(ii).Further, if a consumer chooses not to register, she may invoke the company specificdo-not-call provision to prohibit telemarketing calls from particular telemarketers.16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(A); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d).  The rules also require that,
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when calling consumers, telemarketers must transmit caller ID information.  16C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(7); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1601(e). This requirement assists consumerswho choose not to register but who have caller ID service and want to screen, ratherthan prohibit, unwanted telemarketing calls.Furthermore, none of the alternatives suggested during the rulemaking andduring litigation would have anywhere near the same effect as the registry.  The U.S.Security plaintiffs tout DMA’s do-not-call list, known as the Telephone PreferenceService (TPS).  However, the TPS is voluntary and applies only to DMA members,a small subset of the telemarketers to whom the registry applies.  See 68 Fed. Reg.4630-31.  Telemarketers who violate TPS face only possible dismissal from DMA.In addition, both agencies noted that consumer frustration continues despite thesevoluntary efforts.  68 Fed. Reg. 4630; 18 FCC Rcd. 14017 ¶ 2.  The Mainstream plaintiffs urge “technological alternatives,” which consist ofvarious services offered by local telephone providers and various devices marketedto the public.  See Mainstream Stay Opp. at Appx. D.  All of these measures imposecosts on the public, and none even approaches the degree of protection fromunwanted telemarketing that the registry provides.  18 FCC Rcd. 14041 ¶ 39.  Plain-tiffs hold out caller ID as an example of such services.  But it is costly and theconsumer must screen every call.  Unlike the registry, it does not prevent the intrusion
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caused by unwanted calls.  The TeleZapper is an example of a device that is sold tolimit telemarketing.  It emits a beeping noise that is supposed to fool telemarketerswho use certain automated dialing devices by signaling those devices that theconsumer’s phone line has been disconnected.  Of course, to the extent it works at all,it only affects telemarketers who use certain automated dialing devices.  Moreover,it would eliminate non-telemarketing calls placed by such devices (some schoolsystems use automated dialing systems to send emergency notices to parents), and theTeleZapper’s beep is heard not only by telemarketing calls but by anyone who callsthe consumer.  See www.telezapper.com/faq.htm#3.  Far from being “obvious alterna-tives” to the registry, these options merely show the extent to which consumers, andhence the market, have struggled to solve the problem of unwanted telemarketing.4. The Registry’s Exemption Of Charitable SolicitationDoes Not Violate The First AmendmentThe argument accepted by the district court in Mainstream was not that theregistry extends too broadly but that it does not extend far enough.  The court con-cluded that the do-not-call registry was fatally flawed because charitable solicitationsare subject at most to a company-specific do-not-call restriction and not to the regis-try.  That conclusion was based on a misreading of Supreme Court precedent, and a
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failure to recognize the firm legislative and rulemaking record on which the registryis based.a.  The district court believed its conclusion was compelled by Discovery Net-work.  In that case, Cincinnati, motivated by asserted aesthetic and safety considera-tions, prohibited newsracks that dispensed commercial handbills but allowed all othertypes of newsracks.  See 507 U.S. at 414.  It was established that, as a result of thisdistinction, only 62 newsracks would be removed and 1,500 to 2,000 would remain.See id. at 414, 418.  In invalidating Cincinnati’s action, the Court stressed that anybenefit from such a reduction would be “minute” and “paltry.” Id. at 417-18.  TheCourt ruled that Cincinnati’s distinction between commercial and noncommercialspeech thus bore “no relationship whatsoever” to the interests that the city hadasserted.  Id. at 424. Faced with a scheme that barred commercial speech without advancing thecity’s stated goals, and which ignored other readily available alternatives, the Courtconcluded that, “[i]n the absence of some basis for distinguishing between ‘news-papers’ and ‘commercial handbills’ that is relevant to an interest asserted by the city,we are unwilling to recognize Cincinnati’s bare assertion that the ‘low value’ ofcommercial speech is a sufficient justification for its selective and categorical ban onnewsracks dispensing ‘commercial handouts.’” Id. at 428.  The Court cautioned,
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however, that its holding was “narrow,” and that it was only concluding that, basedon the record before it, Cincinnati had “not established the ‘fit’ between its goals andits chosen means that is required * * *.”  Id.b.  The do-not-call regulations bear no resemblance to the ordinance invali-dated in Discovery Network.  In contrast to Cincinnati’s ordinance, the do-not-callregistry significantly advances the purpose of the legislation and was adopted onlyafter other means of regulation had failed.  As the Eighth Circuit noted in American Blast Fax, the  “legislative record” ofthe TCPA “indicates that commercial calls constitute the bulk of all telemarketingcalls * * *.”  323 F.3d at 658 (citing H. R. Rep. No. 102-317, at 16).  See also id. at655 n.4 (distinguishing Discovery Network because “commercial newsracks repre-sented only a small percentage of the newsracks on Cincinnati streets”); accordDestination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC, 46 F.3d 54, 56 (9th Cir. 1995) (DiscoveryNetwork did not condemn statutory ban on commercial faxes because the bulk ofunwanted faxes are commercial).The record before Congress showed that noncommercial calls constituted arelatively low volume of solicitations, and that the vast majority of consumer com-plaints concerned commercial rather than charitable or political calls.  H.R. Rep. No.102-317 at 16.  The proportion of consumer complaints regarding commercial soli-
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citations ranged from 80 to 99 percent.  Id.  Indeed, the district court recognized thatapplication of the registry even to those callers subject to FTC jurisdiction wouldreduce unwanted telemarketing calls by somewhere between 40 and 60 percent, andthat the gains in privacy protection achieved by the registry are substantial and cannotplausibly be compared to the “paltry three percent reduction in news racks achievedby the city in Discovery Network.”  Mainstream Order at 22.In sharp distinction to Discovery Network, where Cincinnati failed even to con-sider means for advancing its aesthetic and safety concerns that would not havebarred commercial speech, the agencies here established a do-not-call registry onlyafter a decade of experience demonstrated that company-specific lists were ineffectivewith respect to commercial solicitations.  In Discovery Network, the Court stressedthat “[t]he fact that the city failed to address its recently developed concern aboutnewsracks by regulating their size, shape, appearance, or number indicates that it hasnot ‘carefully calculated’ the costs and benefits associated with the burden on speechimposed by its prohibition.”  507 U.S. at 417.  The extensive rulemaking recordmakes plain that precisely the opposite is true here.The distinctions drawn by Congress and the FCC and the FTC are also ground-ed in evidence of a kind wholly lacking in Discovery Network.  In that case, “the onlyjustification advanced by the city for singling out commercial newsracks was ‘the
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“low value” of commercial speech’ * * *.  When Congress enacted the TCPA,however, it had found that “non-commercial calls . . . are less intrusive to consumersbecause they are more expected.”  American Blast Fax, 323 F.3d at 655 (quoting H.R. Rep. 102-317, at 16); see also H.R. Rep. No. 102-317 at 9 (survey data under-scored the resentment generated by calls “from people selling things”).  As noted, thecomplaints prompting the enactment of the TCPA related overwhelmingly tocommercial solicitations.  In excluding calls from tax exempt nonprofit organizationsfrom the TCPA’s definition of “telephone solicitation,” see 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3),Congress not only relied on the evidence that solicitations by nonprofit organizations“were less of a problem than commercial calls,” but it was “sensitive to restraints onits authority to regulate the speech of charitable and political organizations.”  H.R.Rep. 102-317 at 17.  Although the district court concluded that the TCPA findingswere “irrelevant” to its holding, Mainstream Stay Order at 12 n.5, to the extent thefindings justify the distinction between commercial telemarketing and charitablesolicitation that underlies both agencies’ statutes, they firmly support thecorresponding distinctions contained in both agencies’ rules.  10th Cir. Order,10/7/03, at 14-15.Similarly, the FTC’s decision to make charitable solicitations by for-profittelemarketers subject to a company-specific requirement was firmly grounded in the
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administrative record.  As discussed above, the FTC had substantial evidence that thecompany-specific approach was insufficient to control unwanted commercial telemar-keting, but had amassed no similar evidence regarding charitable telemarketing.  68Fed. Reg. at 4629.  Moreover, the rulemaking record supports the conclusion that, inlight of “fundamental differences between commercial solicitations and charitablesolicitations,” the company-specific approach is more likely to be successful in thecharitable context.  68 Fed. Reg. at 4637.  The record includes evidence that tele-marketers soliciting on behalf of charities face different incentives from telemarketersthat sell goods and services, making it more likely that the company-specific provi-sion will work as intended to protect consumer privacy.  See 68 Fed. Reg. 4637.  Italso includes evidence showing that charitable solicitors would be more receptive tothe company-specific provision -- comments to the FTC provided evidence that somecharitable solicitors had already set up their own in-house do not call lists.  See JA405; 18 FCC Rcd. 14070 ¶ 95 (“[w]e note that some tax-exempt nonprofitorganizations have determined to honor voluntarily specific do-not-call requests”).Instead of deferring to the FTC’s determination based on this evidence, the courtrejected it based on its belief that charitable fundraisers are just as likely to engagein fraud as commercial telemarketers.  See Order at 25.  Although charitable solicitorsmay indeed also engage in fraudulent practices, the FTC was focusing on a different
12  The court also relied heavily on Pearson v. Edgar, 153 F.3d 397 (7th Cir.1998).  See Stay Order at 16.  In that case, the Seventh Circuit overturned an Illinoisstatute that, in order to prevent blockbusting, required real estate agents to honorconsumers’ requests to receive no further solicitations.  However, by the time the casehad completed its convoluted legal journey, blockbusting was no longer a problem.To save its statute, the state attempted to assert a last-minute justification for the lawas a protection of consumer privacy.  But the state produced no evidence that realestate solicitation harmed or even threatened privacy.  153 F.3d at 404.  Pearson citedDiscovery Network frequently, but interpreted it to prohibit “severe underinclu-siveness.”  Id.  Because it found that Illinois’ statute was “severe[ly] underinclusive,”it held the statute to be unconstitutional. The do-not-call registry suffers from no suchinfirmity -- it is not “severely underinclusive,” and the district court recognized this.See Mainstream Order at 22. -50-
problem -- whether they would comply with the company-specific provision.  TheFTC contravened no constitutional command by pursuing the company-specificapproach first before applying the do-not-call registry to charitable solicitations.c.  The district court misunderstood not only the distinctions between this caseand Discovery Network, but also the import of that decision.12  The court believedthat Discovery Network represents an application of a general rule that “content dis-crimination” raises grave First Amendment concerns, thus altering the application ofCentral Hudson and requiring heightened First Amendment scrutiny.  MainstreamOrder at 23.That premise is mistaken.  The Supreme Court has made clear that “[i]f com-mercial speech is to be distinguished, it ‘must be distinguished by its content.’”  Batesv. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 363 (1977) (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v.
13  Moreover, the district court’s application of Discovery Network wouldeffectively overrule Rowan -- since, as discussed above, the statute there applied onlyto sexually provocative commercial speech.  There is no indication in DiscoveryNetwork or any other case the that Court intended such a result.  On the contrary, theCourt has continued to cite favorably to Rowan’s central holding.  See, e.g., Hill v.Colorado, 530 U.S. at 717-18; United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.,529 U.S. 803, 814 (2000). -51-
Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976)).  Indeed, commercial speechlimitations are routinely based on the content of the speech in question.  See TransUnion Corp. v. FTC, 267 F.3d at 1141-42.  Thus, although “[i]n most other contexts,the First Amendment prohibits regulation based on the content of the message,” underthe commercial speech doctrine the government is empowered to regulate commercialspeech because of its content.  Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6; see Lanphere &Urbaniak v. Colorado, 21 F.3d 1508, 1513 (10th Cir. 1994) (recognizing commercialspeech restrictions, though “content-based,” are subject to Central Hudson scrutiny).13Discovery Network makes clear that the government cannot bar commercialspeech when doing so would not advance the government’s stated purpose and whenit has failed to consider alternative means of regulation to accomplish its end.  The“low” value of commercial speech cannot justify that result.  507 U.S. at 428.Equally clearly, however, when the government has considered alternative means ofregulation and addresses a problem caused primarily by commercial speech byregulating commercial speech, it is not required to apply identical restrictions to non-
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commercial speech because it might in some respects contribute to the problem.  Thatresult would be flatly at odds with the “subordinate position [of commercial speech]in the scale of First Amendment values.”  Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S.447, 456 (1978).  See National Advertising Co. v. City and County of Denver, 912F.2d 405, 409 (10th Cir. 1990) (“[c]ommercial speech receives less First Amendmentprotection than other constitutionally safeguarded expression”).Indeed, the district court’s analysis conflicts with the Supreme Court’s recogni-tion that “charitable solicitation does more than inform private economic decisionsand is not primarily concerned with providing information about the characteristicsand costs of goods and services.”  Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a BetterEnvironment, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).  Thus, charitable solicitation “has not beendealt with * * * as a variety of commercial speech.”  Id.; see Riley v. National Federa-tion of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988) (speech does not “retain its commercialcharacter when it is inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech”).As the Court has declared, “[t]o require a parity of constitutional protection forcommercial and non-commercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a level-ing process, of the force of the Amendment’s guarantee with respect to the latter kindof speech.”  Fox, 492 U.S. at 481 (citation omitted).  Such a leveling would beparticularly inappropriate here, where one of the principal values underpinning the
14  In Edge, decided only three months after Discovery Network, the Courtupheld a federal ban on broadcast advertising of state-run lotteries.  Although theCourt noted that the statute restricted only the broadcast of advertising, notnoncommercial information regarding lotteries, 509 U.S. at 424, the Court applied theCentral Hudson analysis and made no mention of Discovery Network.-53-
commercial speech doctrine is utterly lacking.  In recognizing that First Amendmentprotection extends to commercial speech, the Supreme Court emphasized that “aparticular consumer’s interest in the free flow of commercial information * * * maybe as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s most urgent politicaldebate,” Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763.  Such interest is plainly absentwhere consumers have expressly indicated that the speech in question is not of valueto them.Nothing in Discovery Network suggests that it casts any doubt on these funda-mental tenets of the Court’s jurisprudence.14  As long as it directly advances a sub-stantial government interest in a sufficiently tailored way, government is empoweredto regulate commercial speech without at the same time regulating noncommercialspeech in precisely the same manner.  Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.II. THE FEE RULE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENTRIGHTS OF TELEMARKETERSAlthough the district court in Mainstream did not address the First Amendmentchallenge to the FTC’s Fee Rule raised by the plaintiffs, see Order at 27, the Main-
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stream plaintiffs have reasserted that challenge before this Court.  Opposition toEmergency Stay Motion, Oct. 1, 2003, at 12-14.  While plaintiffs’ challenge isinsubstantial, it turns on issues of law that are closely related to the constitutionalissues already addressed.  Accordingly, this Court should resolve the issue now.  SeePullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 292 (1982) (reviewing court may enterjudgment where “the record permits only one resolution” of the issue).The fee established by the Fee Rule imposes no unconstitutional prior restrainton speech.  See Mainstream First Amended Complaint at ¶ 159, JA 51.  Evenassuming that the prior restraint doctrine applies to commercial speech, but seeCentral Hudson, 447 U.S. at 571 n.13 (suggesting doctrine may not apply in thiscontext), the Fee Rule imposes no such restraint.  Under the First Amendment, themere fact that a regulation restricts speech in advance of actual expression does notrender the regulation a “prior restraint.”  Instead, a regulation imposes a prior restrainton speech only where the speaker must obtain some sort of permit in advance ofspeaking and the permitting authority enjoys “too much discretion” over the permit-ting process.  American Target Advertising, Inc. v. Giani, 199 F.3d 1241, 1250 (10thCir. 2000); see MacDonald v. City of Chicago, 243 F.3d 1021, 1029-32 (7th Cir.2001).  The Fee Rule (and, for that matter, the do-not-call registry) involves nodiscretionary permitting process and, therefore, no prior restraint.
15  Moreover, the level of the fee is, by any measure, modest as a cost of doingbusiness.  A telemarketer may obtain up to five area codes of the registry at no cost,16 C.F.R. § 310.8(c), and 33 states currently have five or fewer area codes, 18 FCCRcd. 14048 ¶ 54.  Thus, a local business that wishes to telemarket to the entire Stateof Oklahoma (3 area codes) is afforded free access to the list, and a regional companythat wishes to market to all of the States in the Tenth Circuit (15 area codes) may doso for a fee of $250 per year.  Even a company that wishes to telemarket throughoutthe nation (approximately 120 million households) is subject to a maximum fee of$7375.  These fees impose no more than a modest burden on a telemarketer’scommercial speech. -55-
Nor is the fee structure established by the Fee Rule, which imposes sliding feesdepending on the number of area codes of data accessed, in any way unconstitu-tional.15  See Mainstream First Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 158, 161, 162, 168, 170, JA51-53.  “[A] regulatory fee may be constitutional only if it serves a ‘legitimate stateinterest.’” Giani 199 F.3d at 1248-49.  Further, “fees that serve not as revenue taxes,but rather as means to meet the expenses incident to the administration of a regulationand to the maintenance of public order in the matter regulated are constitutionallypermissible.”  National Awareness Foundation v. Abrams, 50 F.3d 1159, 1164-65 (2dCir. 1995); see also Dayton Area Visually Impaired Persons, Inc. v. Fisher, 70 F.3d1474 (6th Cir. 1995) (upholding a $200 registration fee for professional solicitors).Here, the fees are collected “only to offset the costs of activities and services relatedto the implementation and enforcement of the Telemarketing Sales Rule * * *.”  P.L.108-10, § 2; see 68 Fed. Reg. 45141.  Thus, they serve a “legitimate state interest”
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and function “as means to meet the expenses incident to the administration of aregulation and to public order in the matter regulated.”  Accordingly, the fees areconstitutional.III. THE FTC IS AUTHORIZED TO CREATE THE DO-NOT-CALLREGISTRYThe district court in U.S. Security erred as a matter of law in holding that theFTC lacked statutory authority to create the registry.  That authority came from theTCFPA, and was confirmed by Congress’s passage of the Consolidated Appro-priations Resolution and the DNCIA.  Moreover, even if the court’s ruling were cor-rect when issued, P.L. 108-82 removes any doubt about the FTC’s authority andCongress’s express ratification of the Rule.The FTC’s authority to promulgate the registry comes from the TCFPA, whichauthorizes the FTC to prohibit telemarketers from engaging in abusive or deceptivetelemarketing practices, 15 U.S.C. § 6102(a)(1), and from undertaking “a pattern ofunsolicited telephone calls,” 15 U.S.C. § 6102(a)(3)(A).  The FTC’s Rule fleshes outthese broad provisions by defining as abusive a telemarketing call to a person whohas had her number listed on the do-not-call registry.  16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B).The district court mistakenly believed that, because the TCPA specifically authorizesthe FCC to create a do-not-call registry, Congress could not have intended to give the
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FTC the same authority unless the TCFPA contained authorizing language every bitas specific as that of the TCPA.  U.S. Security Order at 12-14.  But in this “era ofoverlapping agency jurisdiction under different statutory mandates,” FTC v. Texaco,Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1977), there is no justification for cabining theFTC’s authority in this manner.  To the extent that there was any question as to the FTC’s authority under theTCFPA, that question was answered through passage of the Consolidated Appropri-ations Resolution in February 2003, and the DNCIA the following month.  TheAppropriations Resolution provided a budget for the FTC and authorized it to spendup to $18.1 million derived from “fees sufficient to implement and enforce the do-not-call provisions of the Telemarketing Sales Rule.”  The DNCIA gives the FTC, fora period of five years, authority to collect fees “sufficient to implement and enforcethe provisions relating to the ‘do-not-call’ registry of the Telemarketing Sales Rule.”P.L. 108-10 at § 2.  The accompanying committee report recognizes that, “[i]n orderto assist consumers in dealing with telemarketing, Congress provided authority to theFTC and the [FCC] to limit these intrusions into their homes.”  H.R. Rep. 108-8 at 2(2003).  The report further notes that the FTC had promulgated the registry pursuantto its authority under the Telemarketing Act.  Id. at 3.
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In passing this legislation, Congress confirmed that the FTC had ample stat-utory authority under the Telemarketing Act to create the registry.  Indeed, “[w]herean agency’s statutory construction has been fully brought to the attention of the publicand the Congress, and the latter has not sought to alter that interpretation although ithas amended the statute in other respects, then presumably the legislative intent hasbeen correctly discerned.”  North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512,535 (1982) (quotation marks omitted).  Here, Congress was well aware that the FTChad promulgated the registry.  By making specific provision for funding and feecollection, Congress recognized that the registry was an appropriate exercise of theFTC’s authority.In any event, Congress has overruled U.S. Security.  On September 29, 2003,President Bush signed into law H.R. 3161, which is titled, “[a]n act to ratify theauthority of the Federal Trade Commission to establish a do-not-call registry.”  P.L.108-82, 117 Stat. 1006 (2003).  Section 1(a) of that Act states that “[t]he FederalTrade Commission is authorized under section 3(a)(3)(A) of the [TCFPA, 15 U.S.C.§ 6102(a)(3)(A)] to implement and enforce a national do-not-call registry.”  Section1(b) states “[t]he do-not-call registry provision of the [FTC’s Rule], which was prom-ulgated by the Federal Trade Commission, effective March 31, 2003, is ratified.”  Thedistrict court recognized that Congress may ratify an agency’s action.  U.S. Security
16  See 149 Cong. Rec. H8916-17 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2003) (statement of Rep.Tauzin, “The bill [H.R. 3161] leaves no doubt as to the intent of Congress.  The FTCwants this list.  The President of the United States wants this list, and more impor-tantly, 50 million Americans, who are growing impatient about being interrupted atmealtime by unwanted and unnecessary harassing telemarketing calls, want this list.And this Congress is going to make sure they have this list today.”)
17  The U.S. Security plaintiffs argued that the judgment in Mainstream rendersthe ratification ineffective.  See U.S. Security Brief Regarding Mootness at 6-8.  Thatargument, however, begs the principal question before this Court.  If this Courtreverses the Mainstream decision, the district court’s decision loses all effect and willhave no impact on P.L. 108-82. Nor is Congress required to invoke any magicformula in a ratifying statute, see Brief Regarding Mootness at 9 n.5, where, as here,its intent to overturn the U.S. Security decision is clear.-59-
Order at 13.  Here, not only did Congress ratify the registry, it also reaffirmed that,contrary to the court’s holding, the FTC already had the authority to create theregistry.  Thus, not only did the district court err as a matter of law, it was alsooverruled by Congress.16  The decision in U.S. Security must be reversed.17
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CONCLUSIONFor the above  reasons, this Court should reverse the district court decisions inU.S. Security and Mainstream, and deny the petitions for review of the FCC’s Order.Respectfully submitted,
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TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C.A. § 227
§ 227. Restrictions on use of telephone equipment (a) DefinitionsAs used in this section--(1) The term "automatic telephone dialing system" means equipment which has the capacity--(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential numbergenerator; and(B) to dial such numbers.(2) The term "telephone facsimile machine" means equipment which has the capacity (A) to transcribe text or images, or both, from paper into an electronic signal and to transmitthat signal over a regular telephone line, or (B) to transcribe text or images (or both) from anelectronic signal received over a regular telephone line onto paper.(3) The term "telephone solicitation" means the initiation of a telephone call or message for thepurpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or services,which is transmitted to any person, but such term does not include a call or message (A) to anyperson with that person's prior express invitation or permission, (B) to any person with whom thecaller has an established business relationship, or (C) by a tax exempt nonprofit organization.(4) The term "unsolicited advertisement" means any material advertising the commercial availabilityor quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person'sprior express invitation or permission.(b) Restrictions on use of automated telephone equipment(1) ProhibitionsIt shall be unlawful for any person within the United States--(A) to make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior expressconsent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial orprerecorded voice--(i) to any emergency telephone line (including any "911" line and any emergency line of a hospital,medical physician or service office, health care facility, poison control center, or fire protection orlaw enforcement agency);
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(ii) to the telephone line of any guest room or patient room of a hospital, health care facility, elderlyhome, or similar establishment; or(iii) to any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specializedmobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which the called partyis charged for the call;(B) to initiate any telephone call to any residential telephone line using an artificial or prerecordedvoice to deliver a message without the prior express consent of the called party, unless the call isinitiated for emergency purposes or is exempted by rule or order by the Commission under paragraph(2)(B);(C) to use any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send an unsolicitedadvertisement to a telephone facsimile machine; or(D) to use an automatic telephone dialing system in such a way that two or more telephone lines ofa multi-line business are engaged simultaneously.(2) Regulations; exemptions and other provisionsThe Commission shall prescribe regulations to implement the requirements of this subsection. Inimplementing the requirements of this subsection, the Commission--(A) shall consider prescribing regulations to allow businesses to avoid receiving calls made usingan artificial or prerecorded voice to which they have not given their prior express consent;(B) may, by rule or order, exempt from the requirements of paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection,subject to such conditions as the Commission may prescribe--(i) calls that are not made for a commercial purpose; and(ii) such classes or categories of calls made for commercial purposes as the Commissiondetermines--(I) will not adversely affect the privacy rights that this section is intended to protect; and(II) do not include the transmission of any unsolicited advertisement; and(C) may, by rule or order, exempt from the requirements of paragraph (1)(A)(iii) of this subsection calls to a telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service thatare not charged to the called party, subject to such conditions as the Commission may prescribe asnecessary in the interest of the privacy rights this section is intended to protect.(3) Private right of action
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A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in anappropriate court of that State--(A) an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under thissubsection to enjoin such violation,(B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 indamages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or(C) both such actions.If the court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated this subsection or the regulationsprescribed under this subsection, the court may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the awardto an amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount available under subparagraph (B) of thisparagraph.(c) Protection of subscriber privacy rights(1) Rulemaking proceeding requiredWithin 120 days after December 20, 1991, the Commission shall initiate a rulemaking proceedingconcerning the need to protect residential telephone subscribers' privacy rights to avoid receivingtelephone solicitations to which they object. The proceeding shall--(A) compare and evaluate alternative methods and procedures (including the use of electronicdatabases, telephone network technologies, special directory markings, industry-based orcompany-specific "do not call" systems, and any other alternatives, individually or in combination)for their effectiveness in protecting such privacy rights, and in terms of their cost and otheradvantages and disadvantages;(B) evaluate the categories of public and private entities that would have the capacity to establish andadminister such methods and procedures;(C) consider whether different methods and procedures may apply for local telephone solicitations,such as local telephone solicitations of small businesses or holders of second class mail permits;(D) consider whether there is a need for additional Commission authority to further restrict telephonesolicitations, including those calls exempted under subsection (a)(3) of this section, and, if such afinding is made and supported by the record, propose specific restrictions to the Congress; and(E) develop proposed regulations to implement the methods and procedures that the Commissiondetermines are most effective and efficient to accomplish the purposes of this section.(2) Regulations
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Not later than 9 months after December 20, 1991, the Commission shall conclude the rulemakingproceeding initiated under paragraph (1) and shall prescribe regulations to implement methods andprocedures for protecting the privacy rights described in such paragraph in an efficient, effective, andeconomic manner and without the imposition of any additional charge to telephone subscribers.(3) Use of database permittedThe regulations required by paragraph (2) may require the establishment and operation of a singlenational database to compile a list of telephone numbers of residential subscribers who object toreceiving telephone solicitations, and to make that compiled list and parts thereof available forpurchase. If the Commission determines to require such a database, such regulations shall--(A) specify a method by which the Commission will select an entity to administer such database;(B) require each common carrier providing telephone exchange service, in accordance withregulations prescribed by the Commission, to inform subscribers for telephone exchange service ofthe opportunity to provide notification, in accordance with regulations established under thisparagraph, that such subscriber objects to receiving telephone solicitations;(C) specify the methods by which each telephone subscriber shall be informed, by the commoncarrier that provides local exchange service to that subscriber, of (i) the subscriber's right to give orrevoke a notification of an objection under subparagraph (A), and (ii) the methods by which suchright may be exercised by the subscriber;(D) specify the methods by which such objections shall be collected and added to the database;(E) prohibit any residential subscriber from being charged for giving or revoking such notification or for being included in a database compiled under this section;(F) prohibit any person from making or transmitting a telephone solicitation to the telephone numberof any subscriber included in such database;(G) specify (i) the methods by which any person desiring to make or transmit telephone solicitationswill obtain access to the database, by area code or local exchange prefix, as required to avoid callingthe telephone numbers of subscribers included in such database; and (ii) the costs to be recoveredfrom such persons;(H) specify the methods for recovering, from persons accessing such database, the costs involvedin identifying, collecting, updating, disseminating, and selling, and other activities relating to, theoperations of the database that are incurred by the entities carrying out those activities;(I) specify the frequency with which such database will be updated and specify the method by whichsuch updating will take effect for purposes of compliance with the regulations prescribed under thissubsection;
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(J) be designed to enable States to use the database mechanism selected by the Commission forpurposes of administering or enforcing State law;(K) prohibit the use of such database for any purpose other than compliance with the requirementsof this section and any such State law and specify methods for protection of the privacy rights of persons whose numbers are included in such database;and(L) require each common carrier providing services to any person for the purpose of makingtelephone solicitations to notify such person of the requirements of this section and the regulationsthereunder.(4) Considerations required for use of database methodIf the Commission determines to require the database mechanism described in paragraph (3), theCommission shall--(A) in developing procedures for gaining access to the database, consider the different needs oftelemarketers conducting business on a national, regional, State, or local level;(B) develop a fee schedule or price structure for recouping the cost of such database that recognizessuch differences and--(i) reflect the relative costs of providing a national, regional, State, or local list of phone numbersof subscribers who object to receiving telephone solicitations;(ii) reflect the relative costs of providing such lists on paper or electronic media; and(iii) not place an unreasonable financial burden on small businesses; and(C) consider (i) whether the needs of telemarketers operating on a local basis could be met throughspecial markings of area white pages directories, and (ii) if such directories are needed as an adjunctto database lists prepared by area code and local exchange prefix.(5) Private right of actionA person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalfof the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection may, if otherwisepermitted by the laws or rules of court of a State bring in an appropriate court of that State--(A) an action based on a violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin suchviolation,
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(B) an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive up to $500 indamages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or(C) both such actions.It shall be an affirmative defense in any action brought under this paragraph that the defendant hasestablished and implemented, with due care, reasonable practices and procedures to effectively prevent telephone solicitations in violation of the regulationsprescribed under this subsection. If the court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violatedthe regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in its discretion, increase the amountof the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount available under subparagraph(B) of this paragraph.(6) Relation to subsection (b)The provisions of this subsection shall not be construed to permit a communication prohibited bysubsection (b) of this section.(d) Technical and procedural standards(1) ProhibitionIt shall be unlawful for any person within the United States--(A) to initiate any communication using a telephone facsimile machine, or to make any telephonecall using any automatic telephone dialing system, that does not comply with the technical and procedural standards prescribed under this subsection, or to useany telephone facsimile machine or automatic telephone dialing system in a manner that does notcomply with such standards; or(B) to use a computer or other electronic device to send any message via a telephone facsimilemachine unless such person clearly marks, in a margin at the top or bottom of each transmitted pageof the message or on the first page of the transmission, the date and time it is sent and anidentification of the business, other entity, or individual sending the message and the telephonenumber of the sending machine or of such business, other entity, or individual.(2) Telephone facsimile machinesThe Commission shall revise the regulations setting technical and procedural standards for telephonefacsimile machines to require that any such machine which is manufactured after one year afterDecember 20, 1991, clearly marks, in a margin at the top or bottom of each transmitted page or onthe first page of each transmission, the date and time sent, an identification of the business, otherentity, or individual sending the message, and the telephone number of the sending machine or ofsuch business, other entity, or individual.
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(3) Artificial or prerecorded voice systemsThe Commission shall prescribe technical and procedural standards for systems that are used totransmit any artificial or prerecorded voice message via telephone. Such standards shall require that--(A) all artificial or prerecorded telephone messages (i) shall, at the beginning of the message, stateclearly the identity of the business, individual, or other entity initiating the call, and (ii) shall, duringor after the message, state clearly the telephone number or address of such business, other entity, orindividual; and(B) any such system will automatically release the called party's line within 5 seconds of the timenotification is transmitted to the system that the called party has hung up, to allow the called party'sline to be used to make or receive other calls.(e) Effect on State law(1) State law not preemptedExcept for the standards prescribed under subsection (d) of this section and subject to paragraph (2)of this subsection, nothing in this section or in the regulations prescribed under this section shallpreempt any State law that imposes more restrictive intrastate requirements or regulations on, orwhich prohibits--(A) the use of telephone facsimile machines or other electronic devices to send unsolicitedadvertisements;(B) the use of automatic telephone dialing systems;(C) the use of artificial or prerecorded voice messages; or(D) the making of telephone solicitations.(2) State use of databasesIf, pursuant to subsection (c)(3) of this section, the Commission requires the establishment of asingle national database of telephone numbers of subscribers who object to receiving telephonesolicitations, a State or local authority may not, in its regulation of telephone solicitations, requirethe use of any database, list, or listing system that does not include the part of such single nationaldatabase that relates to such State.
(f) Actions by States(1) Authority of States
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Whenever the attorney general of a State, or an official or agency designated by a State, has reasonto believe that any person has engaged or is engaging in a pattern or practice of telephone calls orother transmissions to residents of that State in violation of this section or the regulations prescribedunder this section, the State may bring a civil action on behalf of its residents to enjoin such calls,an action to recover for actual monetary loss or receive $500 in damages for each violation, or bothsuch actions. If the court finds the defendant willfully or knowingly violated such regulations, thecourt may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to not more than3 times the amount available under the preceding sentence.(2) Exclusive jurisdiction of Federal courtsThe district courts of the United States, the United States courts of any territory, and the DistrictCourt of the United States for the District of Columbia shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all civilactions brought under this subsection. Upon proper application, such courts shall also havejurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, or orders affording like relief, commanding the defendantto comply with the provisions of this section or regulations prescribed under this section, includingthe requirement that the defendant take such action as is necessary to remove the danger of suchviolation. Upon a proper showing, a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order shall begranted without bond.(3) Rights of CommissionThe State shall serve prior written notice of any such civil action upon the Commission and providethe Commission with a copy of its complaint, except in any case where such prior notice is notfeasible, in which case the State shall serve such notice immediately upon instituting such action.The Commission shall have the right (A) to intervene in the action, (B) upon so intervening, to beheard on all matters arising therein, and (C) to file petitions for appeal.(4) Venue; service of processAny civil action brought under this subsection in a district court of the United States may be broughtin the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business or wherein theviolation occurred or is occurring, and process in such cases may be served in any district in whichthe defendant is an inhabitant or where the defendant may be found.(5) Investigatory powersFor purposes of bringing any civil action under this subsection, nothing in this section shall preventthe attorney general of a State, or an official or agency designated by a State, from exercising thepowers conferred on the attorney general or such official by the laws of such State to conductinvestigations or to administer oaths or affirmations or to compel the attendance of witnesses or theproduction of documentary and other evidence.(6) Effect on State court proceedings
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Nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit an authorized State official fromproceeding in State court on the basis of an alleged violation of any general civil or criminal statuteof such State.(7) LimitationWhenever the Commission has instituted a civil action for violation of regulations prescribed underthis section, no State may, during the pendency of such action instituted by the Commission,subsequently institute a civil action against any defendant named in the Commission's complaint forany violation as alleged in the Commission's complaint.(8) "Attorney general" definedAs used in this subsection, the term "attorney general" means the chief legal officer of a State.
CONGRESSIONAL STATEMENT OF FINDINGSSection 2 of Pub.L. 102-243 provided: "The Congress finds that:"(1) The use of the telephone to market goods and services to the home and other businesses is nowpervasive due to the increased use of cost-effective telemarketing techniques."(2) Over 30,000 businesses actively telemarket goods and services to business and residentialcustomers."(3) More than 300,000 solicitors call more than 18,000,000 Americans every day."(4) Total United States sales generated through telemarketing amounted to $435,000,000,000 in1990, a more than four-fold increase since 1984."(5) Unrestricted telemarketing, however, can be an intrusive invasion of privacy and, when anemergency or medical assistance telephone line is seized, a risk to public safety."(6) Many customers are outraged over the proliferation of intrusive, nuisance calls to their homesfrom telemarketers."(7) Over half the States now have statutes restricting various uses of the telephone for marketing,but telemarketers can evade their prohibitions through interstate operation; therefore, Federal lawis needed to control residential telemarketing practices."(8) The Constitution does not prohibit restrictions on commercial telemarketing solicitations.
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"(9) Individuals' privacy rights, public safety interests, and commercial freedoms of speech and trademust be balanced in a way that protects the privacy of individuals and permits legitimatetelemarketing practices."(10) Evidence compiled by the Congress indicates that residential telephone subscribers considerautomated or prerecorded telephone calls, regardless of the content or the initiator of the message,to be a nuisance and an invasion of privacy."(11) Technologies that might allow consumers to avoid receiving such calls are not universallyavailable, are costly, are unlikely to be enforced, or place an inordinate burden on the consumer."(12) Banning such automated or prerecorded telephone calls to the home, except when the receivingparty consents to receiving the call or when such calls are necessary in an emergency situationaffecting the health and safety of the consumer, is the only effective means of protecting telephoneconsumers from this nuisance and privacy invasion."(13) While the evidence presented to the Congress indicates that automated or prerecorded calls area nuisance and an invasion of privacy, regardless of the type of call, the Federal CommunicationsCommission should have the flexibility to design different rules for those types of automated orprerecorded calls that it finds are not considered a nuisance or invasion of privacy, or fornoncommercial calls, consistent with the free speech protections embodied in the First Amendmentof the Constitution."(14) Businesses also have complained to the Congress and the Federal CommunicationsCommission that automated or prerecorded telephone calls are a nuisance, are an invasion of privacy,and interfere with interstate commerce."(15) The Federal Communications Commission should consider adopting reasonable restrictionson automated or prerecorded calls to businesses as well as to the home, consistent with theconstitutional protections of free speech."
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TELEMARKETING AND CONSUMER FRAUD AND ABUSE  PREVENTION ACT, 15U.S.C. §§ 6101-6108§ 6101. FindingsThe Congress makes the following findings:(1) Telemarketing differs from other sales activities in that it can be carried out by sellers acrossState lines without direct contact with the consumer. Telemarketers also can be very mobile, easilymoving from State to State.(2) Interstate telemarketing fraud has become a problem of such magnitude that the resources of theFederal Trade Commission are not sufficient to ensure adequate consumer protection from suchfraud.(3) Consumers and others are estimated to lose $40 billion a year in telemarketing fraud.(4) Consumers are victimized by other forms of telemarketing deception and abuse.(5) Consequently, Congress should enact legislation that will offer consumers necessary protection from telemarketing deception and abuse.§ 6102. Telemarketing rules (a) In general(1) The Commission shall prescribe rules prohibiting deceptive telemarketing acts or practices andother abusive telemarketing acts or practices.(2) The Commission shall include in such rules respecting deceptive telemarketing acts or practicesa definition of deceptive telemarketing acts or practices which shall include fraudulent charitablesolicitations, and which may include acts or practices of entities or individuals that assist or facilitatedeceptive telemarketing, including credit card laundering.(3) The Commission shall include in such rules respecting other abusive telemarketing acts orpractices--(A) a requirement that telemarketers may not undertake a pattern of unsolicited telephone calls whichthe reasonable consumer would consider coercive or abusive of such consumer's right to privacy,(B) restrictions on the hours of the day and night when unsolicited telephone calls can be made toconsumers,(C) a requirement that any person engaged in telemarketing for the sale of goods or services shallpromptly and clearly disclose to the person receiving the call that the purpose of the call is to sell
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goods or services and make such other disclosures as the Commission deems appropriate, includingthe nature and price of the goods and services; and(D) a requirement that any person engaged in telemarketing for the solicitation of charitablecontributions, donations, or gifts of money or any other thing of value, shall promptly and clearlydisclose to the person receiving the call that the purpose of the call is to solicit charitablecontributions, donations, or gifts, and make such other disclosures as the Commission considersappropriate, including the name and mailing address of the charitable organization on behalf ofwhich the solicitation is made.  In prescribing the rules described in this paragraph, the Commissionshall also consider recordkeeping requirements.(b) RulemakingThe Commission shall prescribe the rules under subsection (a) of this section within 365 days afterAugust 16, 1994. Such rules shall be prescribed in accordance with section 553 of Title 5.(c) EnforcementAny violation of any rule prescribed under subsection (a) of this section shall be treated as a violationof a rule under section 57a of this title regarding unfair or deceptive acts or practices.(d) Securities and Exchange Commission rules(1) Promulgation(A) In generalExcept as provided in subparagraph (B), not later than 6 months after the effective date of rulespromulgated by the Federal Trade Commission under subsection (a) of this section, the Securitiesand Exchange Commission shall promulgate, or require any national securities exchange orregistered securities association to promulgate, rules substantially similar to such rules to prohibitdeceptive and other abusive telemarketing acts or practices by persons described in paragraph (2).(B) ExceptionThe Securities and Exchange Commission is not required to promulgate a rule under subparagraph(A) if it determines that--(i) Federal securities laws or rules adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission thereunderprovide protection from deceptive and other abusive telemarketing by persons described in paragraph(2) substantially similar to that provided by rules promulgated by the Federal Trade Commissionunder subsection (a) of this section; or
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(ii) such a rule promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission is not necessary orappropriate in the public interest, or for the protection of investors, or would be inconsistent withthe maintenance of fair and orderly markets.If the Securities and Exchange Commission determines that an exception described in clause (i) or(ii) applies, the Securities and Exchange Commission shall publish in the Federal Register itsdetermination with the reasons for it.(2) Application(A) In generalThe rules promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission under paragraph (1)(A) shallapply to a broker, dealer, transfer agent, municipal securities dealer, municipal securities broker,government securities broker, government securities dealer, investment adviser or investmentcompany, or any individual associated with a broker, dealer, transfer agent, municipal securitiesdealer, municipal securities broker, government securities broker, government securities dealer,investment adviser or investment company. The rules promulgated by the Federal Trade Commissionunder subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to persons described in the preceding sentence.(B) DefinitionsFor purposes of subparagraph (A)--(i) the terms "broker", "dealer", "transfer agent", "municipal securities dealer", "municipal securitiesbroker", "government securities broker", and "government securities dealer" have the meanings givensuch terms by paragraphs (4), (5), (25), (30), (31), (43), and (44) of section 78c(a) of this title;(ii) the term "investment adviser" has the meaning given such term by section 80b-2(a)(11) of thistitle; and(iii) the term "investment company" has the meaning given such term by section 80a-3(a) of this title.(e) Commodity Futures Trading Commission rules(1) ApplicationThe rules promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission under subsection (a) of this section shallnot apply to persons described in section 9b(1) of Title 7.(2) Omitted§ 6103. Actions by States (a) In general
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Whenever an attorney general of any State has reason to believe that the interests of the residents ofthat State have been or are being threatened or adversely affected because any person has engagedor is engaging in a pattern or practice of telemarketing which violates any rule of the Commissionunder section 6102 of this title, the State, as parens patriae, may bring a civil action on behalf of itsresidents in an appropriate district court of the United States to enjoin such telemarketing, to enforcecompliance with such rule of the Commission, to obtain damages, restitution, or other compensationon behalf of residents of such State, or to obtain such further and other relief as the court may deemappropriate.(b) NoticeThe State shall serve prior written notice of any civil action under subsection (a) or (f)(2) of thissection upon the Commission and provide the Commission with a copy of its complaint, except thatif it is not feasible for the State to provide such prior notice, the State shall serve such noticeimmediately upon instituting such action. Upon receiving a notice respecting a civil action, theCommission shall have the right (1) to intervene in such action, (2) upon so intervening, to be heardon all matters arising therein, and (3) to file petitions for appeal.(c) ConstructionFor purposes of bringing any civil action under subsection (a) of this section, nothing in this chaptershall prevent an attorney general from exercising the powers conferred on the attorney general bythe laws of such State to conduct investigations or to administer oaths or affirmations or to compelthe attendance of witnesses or the production of documentary and other evidence.(d) Actions by CommissionWhenever a civil action has been instituted by or on behalf of the Commission for violation of anyrule prescribed under section 6102 of this title, no State may, during the pendency of such actioninstituted by or on behalf of the Commission, institute a civil action under subsection (a) or (f)(2)of this section against any defendant named in the complaint in such action for violation of any ruleas alleged in such complaint.(e) Venue; service of processAny civil action brought under subsection (a) of this section in a district court of the United Statesmay be brought in the district in which the defendant is found, is an inhabitant, or transacts businessor wherever venue is proper under section 1391 of Title 28. Process in such an action may be servedin any district in which the defendant is an inhabitant or in which the defendant may be found.(f) Actions by other State officials(1) Nothing contained in this section shall prohibit an authorized State official from proceeding inState court on the basis of an alleged violation of any civil or criminal statute of such State.
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(2) In addition to actions brought by an attorney general of a State under subsection (a) of thissection, such an action may be brought by officers of such State who are authorized by the State tobring actions in such State on behalf of its residents.§ 6104. Actions by private persons (a) In generalAny person adversely affected by any pattern or practice of telemarketing which violates any ruleof the Commission under section 6102 of this title, or an authorized person acting on such person'sbehalf, may, within 3 years after discovery of the violation, bring a civil action in an appropriatedistrict court of the United States against a person who has engaged or is engaging in such patternor practice of telemarketing if the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $50,000 inactual damages for each person adversely affected by such telemarketing. Such an action may bebrought to enjoin such telemarketing, to enforce compliance with any rule of the Commission undersection 6102 of this title, to obtain damages, or to obtain such further and other relief as the courtmay deem appropriate.(b) NoticeThe plaintiff shall serve prior written notice of the action upon the Commission and provide theCommission with a copy of its complaint, except in any case where such prior notice is not feasible,in which case the person shall serve such notice immediately upon instituting such action. TheCommission shall have the right (A) to intervene in the action, (B) upon so intervening, to be heardon all matters arising therein, and (C) to file petitions for appeal.(c) Action by CommissionWhenever a civil action has been instituted by or on behalf of the Commission for violation of anyrule prescribed under section 6102 of this title, no person may, during the pendency of such actioninstituted by or on behalf of the Commission, institute a civil action against any defendant namedin the complaint in such action for violation of any rule as alleged in such complaint.(d) Cost and feesThe court, in issuing any final order in any action brought under subsection (a) of this section, mayaward costs of suit and reasonable fees for attorneys and expert witnesses to the prevailing party.(e) ConstructionNothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person may have under any statute orcommon law.(f) Venue; service of process
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Any civil action brought under subsection (a) of this section in a district court of the United Statesmay be brought in the district in which the defendant is found, is an inhabitant, or transacts businessor wherever venue is proper under section 1391 of Title 28. Process in such an action may be servedin any district in which the defendant is an inhabitant or in which the defendant may be found.§ 6105. Administration and applicability of chapter (a) In generalExcept as otherwise provided in sections 6102(d), 6102(e), 6103, and 6104 of this title, this chaptershall be enforced by the Commission under the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41 etseq.). Consequently, no activity which is outside the jurisdiction of that Act shall be affected by thischapter.(b) Actions by CommissionThe Commission shall prevent any person from violating a rule of the Commission under section6102 of this title in the same manner, by the same means, and with the same jurisdiction, powers,and duties as though all applicable terms and provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15U.S.C. 41 et seq.) were incorporated into and made a part of this chapter. Any person who violatessuch rule shall be subject to the penalties and entitled to the privileges and immunities provided inthe Federal Trade Commission Act in the same manner, by the same means, and with the samejurisdiction, power, and duties as though all applicable terms and provisions of the Federal TradeCommission Act were incorporated into and made a part of this chapter.(c) Effect on other lawsNothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to limit the authority of the Commission underany other provision of law.§ 6106. DefinitionsFor purposes of this chapter:(1) The term "attorney general" means the chief legal officer of a State.(2) The term "Commission" means the Federal Trade Commission.(3) The term "State" means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, theNorthern Mariana Islands, and any territory or possession of the United States.(4) The term "telemarketing" means a plan, program, or campaign which is conducted to inducepurchases of goods or services, or a charitable contribution, donation, or gift of money or any otherthing of value, by use of one or more telephones and which involves more than one interstate
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telephone call. The term does not include the solicitation of sales through the mailing of a catalogwhich--(A) contains a written description, or illustration of the goods or services offered for sale,(B) includes the business address of the seller,(C) includes multiple pages of written material or illustrations, and(D) has been issued not less frequently than once a year,where the person making the solicitation does not solicit customers by telephone but only receivescalls initiated by customers in response to the catalog and during those calls takes orders onlywithout further solicitation.§ 6107. Enforcement of orders (a) General authoritySubject to subsections (b) and (c) of this section, the Federal Trade Commission may bring acriminal contempt action for violations of orders of the Commission obtained in cases brought undersection 53(b) of this title.(b) AppointmentAn action authorized by subsection (a) of this section may be brought by the Federal TradeCommission only after, and pursuant to, the appointment by the Attorney General of an attorney employed by the Commission, as a special assistant United StatesAttorney.(c) Request for appointment(1) Appointment upon request or motionA special assistant United States Attorney may be appointed under subsection (b) of this sectionupon the request of the Federal Trade Commission or the court which has entered the order for whichcontempt is sought or upon the Attorney General's own motion.(2) TimingThe Attorney General shall act upon any request made under paragraph (1) within 45 days of thereceipt of the request.(d) Termination of authority
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The authority of the Federal Trade Commission to bring a criminal contempt action under subsection(a) of this section expires 2 years after the date of the first promulgation of rules under section 6102of this title. The expiration of such authority shall have no effect on an action brought before theexpiration date.§ 6108. ReviewUpon the expiration of 5 years following the date of the first promulgation of rules under section6102 of this title, the Commission shall review the implementation of this chapter and its effect ondeceptive telemarketing acts or practices and report the results of the review to the Congress.
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THE DO-NOT-CALL IMPLEMENTATION ACT
Pub.L. 108-10, §§ 1 to 4, Mar. 11, 2003, 117 Stat. 557, provided that:"Section 1. Short title."This Act [this note] may be cited as the 'Do-Not-Call Implementation Act'."Sec. 2. Telemarketing Sales Rule; do-not-call registry fees."The Federal Trade Commission may promulgate regulations establishing fees sufficient toimplement and enforce the provisions relating to the 'do-not- call' registry of the Telemarketing SalesRule (16 CFR 310.4(b)(1)(iii)), promulgated under the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud andAbuse Prevention Act (15 U.S.C. 6101 et seq.) [Pub.L. 103-297, Aug. 16, 1994, 108 Stat. 1545,which enacted chapter 87 of this title, 15 U.S.C.A. § 6101 et seq.]. Such regulations shall bepromulgated in accordance with section 553 of title 5, United States Code. Fees may be collectedpursuant to this section for fiscal years 2003 through 2007, and shall be deposited and credited asoffsetting collections to the account, Federal trade Commission--Salaries and 
Expenses, and shall remain available until expended. No amounts shall be collected as fees pursuantto this section for such fiscal years except to the extent provided in advance in appropriations Acts.Such amounts shall be available for expenditure only to offset the costs of activities and servicesrelated to the implementation and enforcement of the Telemarketing Sales Rule, and other activitiesresulting from such implementation and enforcement."Sec. 3. Federal Communications Commission do-not-call regulations."Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act [Mar. 11, 2003], the FederalCommunications Commission shall issue a final rule pursuant to the rulemaking proceeding that itbegan on September 18, 2002, under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act [Telephone ConsumerProtection Act of 1991 (TCPA), Pub.L. 102-243, Dec. 20, 1991, 105 Stat. 2394] (47 U.S.C. 227 etseq.). In issuing such rule, the Federal Communications Commission shall consult and coordinatewith the Federal Trade Commission to maximize consistency with the rule promulgated by theFederal Trade Commission (16 CFR 310.4(b))."Sec. 4. Reporting requirements."(a) Report on regulatory coordination.--Within 45 days after the promulgation of a final rule by theFederal Communications Commission as required by section 3 [of this note], the Federal TradeCommission and the Federal Communications Commission shall each transmit to the Committeeon Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce,Science, and Transportation of the Senate a report which shall include--
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"(1) an analysis of the telemarketing rules promulgated by both the Federal Trade Commission andthe Federal Communications Commission;"(2) any inconsistencies between the rules promulgated by each such Commission and the effect ofany such inconsistencies on consumers, and persons paying for access to the registry; and"(3) proposals to remedy any such inconsistencies."(b) Annual report.--For each of fiscal years 2003 through 2007, the Federal Trade Commission andthe Federal Communications Commission shall each transmit an annual report to the Committee onEnergy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science,and Transportation of the Senate a report which shall include--"(1) an analysis of the effectiveness of the 'do-not-call' registry as a national registry;"(2) the number of consumers who have placed their telephone numbers on the registry;"(3) the number of persons paying fees for access to the registry and the amount of such fees;"(4) an analysis of the progress of coordinating the operation and enforcement of the 'do-not-call'registry with similar registries established and maintained by the various States;"(5) an analysis of the progress of coordinating the operation and enforcement of the 'do-not-call'registry with the enforcement activities of the Federal Communications Commission pursuant to theTelephone Consumer Protection Act (47 U.S.C. 227 et seq.); and"(6) a review of the enforcement proceedings under the Telemarketing Sales Rule (16 CFR 310), inthe case of the Federal Trade Commission, and under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (47U.S.C. 227 et seq.), in the case of the Federal Communications Commission."
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P.L. 108-82, 117 Stat. 1006NATIONAL DO-NOT-CALL REGISTRY
  An Act To ratify the authority of the Federal Trade Commission to establish a do-not-call registry.Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United Statesof America in Congress assembled,SECTION 1. NATIONAL DO-NOT-CALL REGISTRY.(a) AUTHORITY.--The Federal Trade Commission is authorized under section 3(a)(3)(A) of theTelemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act (15 U.S.C. 6102(a)(3)(A)) toimplement and enforce a national do-not-call registry.(b) RATIFICATION.--The do-not-call registry provision of the Telemarketing Sales Rule (16 C.F.R.310.4(b)(1)(iii)), which was promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission, effective March 31,2003, is ratified.
Approved September 29, 2003.
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PART 310--TELEMARKETING SALES RULE§ 310.1 Scope of regulations in this part.This part implements the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, 15 U.S.C.6101-6108, as amended.§ 310.2 Definitions.(a) Acquirer means a business organization, financial institution, or an agent of a businessorganization or financial institution that has authority from an organization that operates or licensesa credit card system to authorize merchants to accept, transmit, or process payment by credit cardthrough the credit card system for money, goods or services, or anything else of value.(b) Attorney General means the chief legal officer of a state.(c) Billing information means any data that enables any person to access a customer's or donor'saccount, such as a credit card, checking, savings, share or similar account, utility bill, mortgage loanaccount, or debit card.(d) Caller identification service means a service that allows a telephone subscriber to have thetelephone number, and, where available, name of the calling party transmitted contemporaneouslywith the telephone call, and displayed on a device in or connected to the subscriber's telephone.(e) Cardholder means a person to whom a credit card is issued or who is authorized to use a creditcard on behalf of or in addition to the person to whom the credit card is issued.(f) Charitable contribution means any donation or gift of money or any other thing of value.(g) Commission means the Federal Trade Commission.(h) Credit means the right granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer payment of debt or to incur debtand defer its payment.(i) Credit card means any card, plate, coupon book, or other credit device existing for the purposeof obtaining money, property, labor, or services on credit.(j) Credit card sales draft means any record or evidence of a credit card transaction.(k) Credit card system means any method or procedure used to process credit card transactionsinvolving credit cards issued or licensed by the operator of that system.(l) Customer means any person who is or may be required to pay for goods or services offeredthrough telemarketing.
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(m) Donor means any person solicited to make a charitable contribution.(n) Established business relationship means a relationship between a seller and a consumer basedon:(1) the consumer's purchase, rental, or lease of the seller's goods or services or a financial transactionbetween the consumer and seller, within the eighteen (18) months immediately preceding the dateof a telemarketing call; or(2) the consumer's inquiry or application regarding a product or service offered by the seller, withinthe three (3) months immediately preceding the date of a telemarketing call.(o) Free-to-pay conversion means, in an offer or agreement to sell or provide any goods or services,a provision under which a customer receives a product or service for free for an initial period andwill incur an obligation to pay for the product or service if he or she does not take affirmative actionto cancel before the end of that period.(p) Investment opportunity means anything, tangible or intangible, that is offered, offered for sale,sold, or traded based wholly or in part on representations, either express or implied, about past,present, or future income, profit, or appreciation.(q) Material means likely to affect a person's choice of, or conduct regarding, goods or services ora charitable contribution.(r) Merchant means a person who is authorized under a written contract with an acquirer to honoror accept credit cards, or to transmit or process for payment credit card payments, for the purchaseof goods or services or a charitable contribution.(s) Merchant agreement means a written contract between a merchant and an acquirer to honor oraccept credit cards, or to transmit or process for payment credit card payments, for the purchase ofgoods or services or a charitable contribution.(t) Negative option feature means, in an offer or agreement to sell or provide any goods or services,a provision under which the customer's silence or failure to take an affirmative action to reject goodsor services or to cancel the agreement is interpreted by the seller as acceptance of the offer.(u) Outbound telephone call means a telephone call initiated by a telemarketer to induce the purchaseof goods or services or to solicit a charitable contribution.(v) Person means any individual, group, unincorporated association, limited or general partnership,corporation, or other business entity.(w) Preacquired account information means any information that enables a seller or telemarketer tocause a charge to be placed against a customer's or donor's account without obtaining the account
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number directly from the customer or donor during the telemarketing transaction pursuant to whichthe account will be charged.(x) Prize means anything offered, or purportedly offered, and given, or purportedly given, to a personby chance. For purposes of this definition, chance exists if a person is guaranteed to receive an itemand, at the time of the offer or purported offer, the telemarketer does not identify the specific itemthat the person will receive.(y) Prize promotion means:(1) A sweepstakes or other game of chance; or(2) An oral or written express or implied representation that a person has won, has been selected toreceive, or may be eligible to receive a prize or purported prize.(z) Seller means any person who, in connection with a telemarketing transaction, provides, offersto provide, or arranges for others to provide goods or services to the customer in exchange forconsideration.(aa) State means any state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the NorthernMariana Islands, and any territory or possession of the United States.(bb) Telemarketer means any person who, in connection with telemarketing, initiates or receivestelephone calls to or from a customer or donor.(cc) Telemarketing means a plan, program, or campaign which is conducted to induce the purchaseof goods or services or a charitable contribution, by use of one or more telephones and whichinvolves more than one interstate telephone call. The term does not include the solicitation of salesthrough the mailing of a catalog which: contains a written description or illustration of the goods orservices offered for sale; includes the business address of the seller; includes multiple pages ofwritten material or illustrations; and has been issued not less frequently than once a year, when theperson making the solicitation does not solicit customers by telephone but only receives callsinitiated by customers in response to the catalog and during those calls takes orders only withoutfurther solicitation. For purposes of the previous sentence, the term "further solicitation" does notinclude providing the customer with information about, or attempting to sell, any other item includedin the same catalog which prompted the customer's call or in a substantially similar catalog.(dd) Upselling means soliciting the purchase of goods or services following an initial transactionduring a single telephone call. The upsell is a separate telemarketing transaction, not a continuation of the initial transaction. An "external upsell" is asolicitation made by or on behalf of a seller different from the seller in the initial transaction,regardless of whether the initial transaction and the subsequent solicitation are made by the sametelemarketer. An "internal upsell" is a solicitation made by or on behalf of the same seller as in theinitial transaction, regardless of whether the initial transaction and subsequent solicitation are madeby the same telemarketer.
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§ 310.3 Deceptive telemarketing acts or practices.(a) Prohibited deceptive telemarketing acts or practices. It is a deceptive telemarketing act or practiceand a violation of this Rule for any seller or telemarketer to engage in the following conduct:(1) Before a customer pays [FN1] for goods or services offered, failing to disclose truthfully, in aclear and conspicuous manner, the following material information:[FN1] When a seller or telemarketer uses, or directs a customer to use, a courier to transportpayment, the seller or telemarketer must make the disclosures required by § 310.3(a)(1) beforesending a courier to pick up payment or authorization for payment, or directing a customer to havea courier pick up payment or authorization for payment.(i) The total costs to purchase, receive, or use, and the quantity of, any goods or services that are thesubject of the sales offer; [FN2] [FN2] For offers of consumer credit products subject to the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1601et seq., and Regulation Z, 12 CFR 226, compliance with the disclosure requirements under the Truthin Lending Act and Regulation Z shall constitute compliance with § 310.3(a)(1)(i) of this Rule.(ii) All material restrictions, limitations, or conditions to purchase, receive, or use the goods orservices that are the subject of the sales offer;(iii) If the seller has a policy of not making refunds, cancellations, exchanges, or repurchases, astatement informing the customer that this is the seller's policy; or, if the seller or telemarketer makesa representation about a refund, cancellation, exchange, or repurchase policy, a statement of allmaterial terms and conditions of such policy;(iv) In any prize promotion, the odds of being able to receive the prize, and, if the odds are notcalculable in advance, the factors used in calculating the odds; that no purchase or payment isrequired to win a prize or to participate in a prize promotion and that any purchase or payment willnot increase the person's chances of winning; and the no-purchase/no-payment method ofparticipating in the prize promotion with either instructions on how to participate or an address orlocal or toll-free telephone number to which customers may write or call for information on how toparticipate;(v) All material costs or conditions to receive or redeem a prize that is the subject of the prizepromotion;(vi) In the sale of any goods or services represented to protect, insure, or otherwise limit a customer'sliability in the event of unauthorized use of the customer's credit card, the limits on a cardholder'sliability for unauthorized use of a credit card pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1643; and(vii) If the offer includes a negative option feature, all material terms and conditions of the negativeoption feature, including, but not limited to, the fact that the customer's account will be charged
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unless the customer takes an affirmative action to avoid the charge(s), the date(s) the charge(s) willbe submitted for payment, and the specific steps the customer must take to avoid the charge(s).(2) Misrepresenting, directly or by implication, in the sale of goods or services any of the followingmaterial information:(i) The total costs to purchase, receive, or use, and the quantity of, any goods or services that are thesubject of a sales offer;(ii) Any material restriction, limitation, or condition to purchase, receive, or use goods or servicesthat are the subject of a sales offer;(iii) Any material aspect of the performance, efficacy, nature, or central characteristics of goods orservices that are the subject of a sales offer;(iv) Any material aspect of the nature or terms of the seller's refund, cancellation, exchange, orrepurchase policies;(v) Any material aspect of a prize promotion including, but not limited to, the odds of being able toreceive a prize, the nature or value of a prize, or that a purchase or payment is required to win a prizeor to participate in a prize promotion;(vi) Any material aspect of an investment opportunity including, but not limited to, risk, liquidity,earnings potential, or profitability;(vii) A seller's or telemarketer's affiliation with, or endorsement or sponsorship by, any person orgovernment entity;(viii) That any customer needs offered goods or services to provide protections a customer alreadyhas pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1643; or(ix) Any material aspect of a negative option feature including, but not limited to, the fact that thecustomer's account will be charged unless the customer takes an affirmative action to avoid thecharge(s), the date(s) the charge(s) will be submitted for payment, and the specific steps the customermust take to avoid the charge(s).(3) Causing billing information to be submitted for payment, or collecting or attempting to collectpayment for goods or services or a charitable contribution, directly or indirectly, without thecustomer's or donor's express verifiable authorization, except when the method of payment used isa credit card subject to protections of the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z, [FN3] or a debitcard subject to the protections of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act and Regulation E. [FN4] Suchauthorization shall be deemed verifiable if any of the following means is employed: [FN3] Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq., and Regulation Z, 12 CFR part 226.
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 [FN4] Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. 1693 et seq., and Regulation E, 12 CFR part 205.(i) Express written authorization by the customer or donor, which includes the customer's or donor'ssignature; [FN5] [FN5] For purposes of this Rule, the term "signature" shall include an electronic or digital form ofsignature, to the extent that such form of signature is recognized as a valid signature under applicablefederal law or state contract law.(ii) Express oral authorization which is audio-recorded and made available upon request to thecustomer or donor, and the customer's or donor's bank or other billing entity, and which evidencesclearly both the customer's or donor's authorization of payment for the goods or services or charitablecontribution that are the subject of the telemarketing transaction and the customer's or donor's receiptof all of the following information:(A) The number of debits, charges, or payments (if more than one);(B) The date(s) the debit(s), charge(s), or payment(s) will be submitted for payment;(C) The amount(s) of the debit(s), charge(s), or payment(s);(D) The customer's or donor's name;(E) The customer's or donor's billing information, identified with sufficient specificity such that thecustomer or donor understands what account will be used to collect payment for the goods orservices or charitable contribution that are the subject of the telemarketing transaction;(F) A telephone number for customer or donor inquiry that is answered during normal businesshours; and(G) The date of the customer's or donor's oral authorization; or(iii) Written confirmation of the transaction, identified in a clear and conspicuous manner as suchon the outside of the envelope, sent to the customer or donor via first class mail prior to thesubmission for payment of the customer's or donor's billing information, and that includes all of theinformation contained in §§ 310.3(a)(3)(ii)(A)-(G) and a clear and conspicuous statement of theprocedures by which the customer or donor can obtain a refund from the seller or telemarketer orcharitable organization in the event the confirmation is inaccurate; provided, however, that thismeans of authorization shall not be deemed verifiable in instances in which goods or services areoffered in a transaction involving a free-to-pay conversion and preacquired account information.(4) Making a false or misleading statement to induce any person to pay for goods or services or toinduce a charitable contribution.
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(b) Assisting and facilitating. It is a deceptive telemarketing act or practice and a violation of thisRule for a person to provide substantial assistance or support to any seller or telemarketer when thatperson knows or consciously avoids knowing that the seller or telemarketer is engaged in any act orpractice that violates §§ 310.3(a), (c) or (d), or § 310.4 of this Rule.(c) Credit card laundering. Except as expressly permitted by the applicable credit card system, it isa deceptive telemarketing act or practice and a violation of this Rule for:(1) A merchant to present to or deposit into, or cause another to present to or deposit into, the creditcard system for payment, a credit card sales draft generated by a telemarketing transaction that is notthe result of a telemarketing credit card transaction between the cardholder and the merchant;(2) Any person to employ, solicit, or otherwise cause a merchant, or an employee, representative, oragent of the merchant, to present to or deposit into the credit card system for payment, a credit cardsales draft generated by a telemarketing transaction that is not the result of a telemarketing creditcard transaction between the cardholder and the merchant; or(3) Any person to obtain access to the credit card system through the use of a business relationshipor an affiliation with a merchant, when such access is not authorized by the merchant agreement orthe applicable credit card system.(d) Prohibited deceptive acts or practices in the solicitation of charitable contributions. It is afraudulent charitable solicitation, a deceptive telemarketing act or practice, and a violation of thisRule for any telemarketer soliciting charitable contributions to misrepresent, directly or byimplication, any of the following material information:(1) The nature, purpose, or mission of any entity on behalf of which a charitable contribution is beingrequested;(2) That any charitable contribution is tax deductible in whole or in part;(3) The purpose for which any charitable contribution will be used;(4) The percentage or amount of any charitable contribution that will go to a charitable organizationor to any particular charitable program;(5) Any material aspect of a prize promotion including, but not limited to: the odds of being able toreceive a prize; the nature or value of a prize; or that a charitable contribution is required to win aprize or to participate in a prize promotion; or(6) A charitable organization's or telemarketer's affiliation with, or endorsement or sponsorship by,any person or government entity.§ 310.4 Abusive telemarketing acts or practices.
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(a) Abusive conduct generally. It is an abusive telemarketing act or practice and a violation of thisRule for any seller or telemarketer to engage in the following conduct:(1) Threats, intimidation, or the use of profane or obscene language;(2) Requesting or receiving payment of any fee or consideration for goods or services representedto remove derogatory information from, or improve, a person's credit history, credit record, or creditrating until:(i) The time frame in which the seller has represented all of the goods or services will be providedto that person has expired; and(ii) The seller has provided the person with documentation in the form of a consumer report froma consumer reporting agency demonstrating that the promised results have been achieved, such reporthaving been issued more than six months after the results were achieved. Nothing in this Rule shouldbe construed to affect the requirement in the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681, that aconsumer report may only be obtained for a specified permissible purpose;(3) Requesting or receiving payment of any fee or consideration from a person for goods or servicesrepresented to recover or otherwise assist in the return of money or any other item of value paid forby, or promised to, that person in a previous telemarketing transaction, until seven (7) business daysafter such money or other item is delivered to that person. This provision shall not apply to goodsor services provided to a person by a licensed attorney;(4) Requesting or receiving payment of any fee or consideration in advance of obtaining a loan orother extension of credit when the seller or telemarketer has guaranteed or represented a highlikelihood of success in obtaining or arranging a loan or other extension of credit for a person;(5) Disclosing or receiving, for consideration, unencrypted consumer account numbers for use intelemarketing; provided, however, that this paragraph shall not apply to the disclosure or receipt ofa customer's or donor's billing information to process a payment for goods or services or a charitable contribution pursuant to atransaction;(6) Causing billing information to be submitted for payment, directly or indirectly, without theexpress informed consent of the customer or donor. In any telemarketing transaction, the seller ortelemarketer must obtain the express informed consent of the customer or donor to be charged forthe goods or services or charitable contribution and to be charged using the identified account. In anytelemarketing transaction involving preacquired account information, the requirements in paragraphs(a)(6)(i) through (ii) of this section must be met to evidence express informed consent.(i) In any telemarketing transaction involving preacquired account information and a free-to-payconversion feature, the seller or telemarketer must:
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(A) obtain from the customer, at a minimum, the last four (4) digits of the account number to becharged;(B) obtain from the customer his or her express agreement to be charged for the goods or servicesand to be charged using the account number pursuant to paragraph (a)(6)(i)(A) of this section; and,(C) make and maintain an audio recording of the entire telemarketing transaction.(ii) In any other telemarketing transaction involving preacquired account information not described in paragraph (a)(6)(i) of this section, the seller or telemarketer must:(A) at a minimum, identify the account to be charged with sufficient specificity for the customer ordonor to understand what account will be charged; and(B) obtain from the customer or donor his or her express agreement to be charged for the goods orservices and to be charged using the account number identified pursuant to paragraph (a)(6)(ii)(A)of this section; or<Compliance date of subsection (a)(7) is Jan. 29, 2004.>(7) Failing to transmit or cause to be transmitted the telephone number, and, when made availableby the telemarketer's carrier, the name of the telemarketer, to any caller identification service in useby a recipient of a telemarketing call; provided that it shall not be a violation to substitute (for thename and phone number used in, or billed for, making the call) the name of the seller or charitableorganization on behalf of which a telemarketing call is placed, and the seller's or charitableorganization's customer or donor service telephone number, which is answered during regularbusiness hours.(b) Pattern of calls.(1) It is an abusive telemarketing act or practice and a violation of this Rule for a telemarketer toengage in, or for a seller to cause a telemarketer to engage in, the following conduct:(i) Causing any telephone to ring, or engaging any person in telephone conversation, repeatedly orcontinuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number;(ii) Denying or interfering in any way, directly or indirectly, with a person's right to be placed on anyregistry of names and/or telephone numbers of persons who do not wish to receive outboundtelephone calls established to comply with § 310.4(b)(1)(iii);(iii) Initiating any outbound telephone call to a person when:(A) that person previously has stated that he or she does not wish to receive an outbound telephonecall made by or on behalf of the seller whose goods or services are being offered or made on behalfof the charitable organization for which a charitable contribution is being solicited; or
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<Compliance date of subsection (b)(1)(iii)(B) is (date pending).>(B) that person's telephone number is on the "do-not-call" registry, maintained by the Commission, of persons who do not wish to receive outbound telephone calls toinduce the purchase of goods or services unless the seller(i) has obtained the express agreement, in writing, of such person to place calls to that person. Suchwritten agreement shall clearly evidence such person's authorization that calls made by or on behalfof a specific party may be placed to that person, and shall include the telephone number to which thecalls may be placed and the signature [FN6] of that person; or
 [FN6] For purposes of this Rule, the term "signature" shall include an electronic or digital form ofsignature, to the extent that such form of signature is recognized as a valid signature under applicablefederal law or state contract law.(ii) has an established business relationship with such person, and that person has not stated that heor she does not wish to receive outbound telephone calls under paragraph (b)(1)(iii)(A) of thissection; or(iv) Abandoning any outbound telephone call. An outbound telephone call is "abandoned" under thissection if a person answers it and the telemarketer does not connect the call to a sales representativewithin two (2) seconds of the person's completed greeting.(2) It is an abusive telemarketing act or practice and a violation of this Rule for any person to sell,rent, lease, purchase, or use any list established to comply with § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(A), or maintainedby the Commission pursuant to § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B), for any purpose except compliance with theprovisions of this Rule or otherwise to prevent telephone calls to telephone numbers on such lists.(3) A seller or telemarketer will not be liable for violating § 310.4(b)(1)(ii) and (iii) if it candemonstrate that, as part of the seller's or telemarketer's routine business practice:(i) It has established and implemented written procedures to comply with § 310.4(b)(1)(ii) and (iii);(ii) It has trained its personnel, and any entity assisting in its compliance, in the proceduresestablished pursuant to § 310.4(b)(3)(i);(iii) The seller, or a telemarketer or another person acting on behalf of the seller or charitableorganization, has maintained and recorded a list of telephone numbers the seller or charitableorganization may not contact, in compliance with § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(A);(iv) The seller or a telemarketer uses a process to prevent telemarketing to any telephone number onany list established pursuant to §§ 310.4(b)(3)(iii) or 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B), employing a version of the"do-not-call" registry obtained 
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from the Commission no more than three (3) months prior to the date any call is made, and maintainsrecords documenting this process;(v) The seller or a telemarketer or another person acting on behalf of the seller or charitableorganization, monitors and enforces compliance with the procedures established pursuant to §310.4(b)(3)(i); and(vi) Any subsequent call otherwise violating § 310.4(b)(1)(ii) or (iii) is the result of error.(4) A seller or telemarketer will not be liable for violating 310.4(b)(1)(iv) if:(i) the seller or telemarketer employs technology that ensures abandonment of no more than three(3) percent of all calls answered by a person, measured per day per calling campaign;(ii) the seller or telemarketer, for each telemarketing call placed, allows the telephone to ring for atleast fifteen (15) seconds or four (4) rings before disconnecting an unanswered call;(iii) whenever a sales representative is not available to speak with the person answering the callwithin two (2) seconds after the person's completed greeting, the seller or telemarketer promptlyplays a recorded message that states the name and telephone number of the seller on whose behalfthe call was placed [FN7]; and [FN7] This provision does not affect any seller's or telemarketer's obligation to comply with relevantstate and federal laws, including but not limited to the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. 227, and 47 CFR part64.1200.(iv) the seller or telemarketer, in accordance with § 310.5(b)-(d), retains records establishingcompliance with § 310.4(b)(4)(i)-(iii).(c) Calling time restrictions. Without the prior consent of a person, it is an abusive telemarketing actor practice and a violation of this Rule for a telemarketer to engage in outbound telephone calls toa person's residence at any time other than between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m. local time at the calledperson's location.(d) Required oral disclosures in the sale of goods or services. It is an abusive telemarketing act orpractice and a violation of this Rule for a telemarketer in an outbound telephone call or internal orexternal upsell to induce the purchase of goods or services to fail to disclose truthfully, promptly,and in a clear and conspicuous manner to the person receiving the call, the following information:(1) The identity of the seller;(2) That the purpose of the call is to sell goods or services;(3) The nature of the goods or services; and
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(4) That no purchase or payment is necessary to be able to win a prize or participate in a prizepromotion if a prize promotion is offered and that any purchase or payment will not increase theperson's chances of winning. This disclosure must be made before or in conjunction with thedescription of the prize to the person called. If requested by that person, the telemarketer mustdisclose the no-purchase/no-payment entry method for the prize promotion; provided, however, that,in any internal upsell for the sale of goods or services, the seller or telemarketer must provide thedisclosures listed in this section only to the extent that the information in the upsell differs from thedisclosures provided in the initial telemarketing transaction.(e) Required oral disclosures in charitable solicitations. It is an abusive telemarketing act or practiceand a violation of this Rule for a telemarketer, in an outbound telephone call to induce a charitablecontribution, to fail to disclose truthfully, promptly, and in a clear and conspicuous manner to theperson receiving the call, the following information:(1) The identity of the charitable organization on behalf of which the request is being made; and(2) That the purpose of the call is to solicit a charitable contribution.§ 310.5 Recordkeeping requirements.(a) Any seller or telemarketer shall keep, for a period of 24 months from the date the record isproduced, the following records relating to its telemarketing activities:(1) All substantially different advertising, brochures, telemarketing scripts, and promotionalmaterials;(2) The name and last known address of each prize recipient and the prize awarded for prizes thatare represented, directly or by implication, to have a value of $25.00 or more;(3) The name and last known address of each customer, the goods or services purchased, the date such goods or services were shipped or provided, and the amount paid by thecustomer for the goods or services; [FN8] [FN8] For offers of consumer credit products subject to the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1601et seq., and Regulation Z, 12 CFR 226, compliance with the recordkeeping requirements under theTruth in Lending Act, and Regulation Z, shall constitute compliance with § 310.5(a)(3) of this Rule.(4) The name, any fictitious name used, the last known home address and telephone number, and thejob title(s) for all current and former employees directly involved in telephone sales or solicitations;provided, however, that if the seller or telemarketer permits fictitious names to be used byemployees, each fictitious name must be traceable to only one specific employee; and(5) All verifiable authorizations or records of express informed consent or express agreementrequired to be provided or received under this Rule.
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(b) A seller or telemarketer may keep the records required by § 310.5(a) in any form, and in the samemanner, format, or place as they keep such records in the ordinary course of business. Failure to keepall records required by § 310.5(a) shall be a violation of this Rule.(c) The seller and the telemarketer calling on behalf of the seller may, by written agreement, allocateresponsibility between themselves for the recordkeeping required by this Section. When a seller andtelemarketer have entered into such an agreement, the terms of that agreement shall govern, and theseller or telemarketer, as the case may be, need not keep records that duplicate those of the other. Ifthe agreement is unclear as to who must maintain any required record(s), or if no such agreementexists, the seller shall be responsible for complying with §§ 310.5(a)(1)-(3) and (5); the telemarketershall be responsible for complying with § 310.5(a)(4).(d) In the event of any dissolution or termination of the seller's or telemarketer's business, theprincipal of that seller or telemarketer shall maintain all records as required under this Section. Inthe event of any sale, assignment, or other change in ownership of the seller's or telemarketer'sbusiness, the successor business shall maintain all records required under this Section.§ 310.6 Exemptions.(a) Solicitations to induce charitable contributions via outbound telephone calls are not covered by§ 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B) of this Rule.(b) The following acts or practices are exempt from this Rule:(1) The sale of pay-per-call services subject to the Commission's Rule entitled "Trade RegulationRule Pursuant to the Telephone Disclosure and Dispute Resolution Act of 1992," 16 CFR Part 308,provided, however, that this exemption does not apply to the requirements of §§ 310.4(a)(1), (a)(7),(b), and (c);(2) The sale of franchises subject to the Commission's Rule entitled "Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and Business OpportunityVentures," ("Franchise Rule") 16 CFR Part 436, provided, however, that this exemption does notapply to the requirements of §§ 310.4(a)(1), (a)(7), (b), and (c);(3) Telephone calls in which the sale of goods or services or charitable solicitation is not completed,and payment or authorization of payment is not required, until after a face-to-face sales or donationpresentation by the seller or charitable organization, provided, however, that this exemption does notapply to the requirements of §§ 310.4(a)(1), (a)(7), (b), and (c);(4) Telephone calls initiated by a customer or donor that are not the result of any solicitation by aseller, charitable organization, or telemarketer, provided, however, that this exemption does notapply to any instances of upselling included in such telephone calls;(5) Telephone calls initiated by a customer or donor in response to an advertisement through anymedium, other than direct mail solicitation, provided, however, that this exemption does not apply
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to calls initiated by a customer or donor in response to an advertisement relating to investmentopportunities, business opportunities other than business arrangements covered by the FranchiseRule, or advertisements involving goods or services described in §§ 310.3(a)(1)(vi) or310.4(a)(2)-(4); or to any instances of upselling included in such telephone calls;(6) Telephone calls initiated by a customer or donor in response to a direct mail solicitation,including solicitations via the U.S. Postal Service, facsimile transmission, electronic mail, and othersimilar methods of delivery in which a solicitation is directed to specific address(es) or person(s),that clearly, conspicuously, and truthfully discloses all material information listed in § 310.3(a)(1)of this Rule, for any goods or services offered in the direct mail solicitation, and that contains nomaterial misrepresentation regarding any item contained in § 310.3(d) of this Rule for any requestedcharitable contribution; provided, however, that this exemption does not apply to calls initiated bya customer in response to a direct mail solicitation relating to prize promotions, investmentopportunities, business opportunities other than business arrangements covered by the FranchiseRule, or goods or services described in §§ 310.3(a)(1)(vi) or 310.4(a)(2)-(4); or to any instances ofupselling included in such telephone calls; and(7) Telephone calls between a telemarketer and any business, except calls to induce the retail saleof nondurable office or cleaning supplies; provided, however, that § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B) and § 310.5of this Rule shall not apply to sellers or telemarketers of nondurable office or cleaning supplies.§ 310.7 Actions by states and private persons.(a) Any attorney general or other officer of a state authorized by the state to bring an action underthe Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, and any private person whobrings an action under that Act, shall serve written notice of its action on the Commission, iffeasible, prior to its initiating an action under this Rule. The notice shall be sent to the Office of theDirector, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C. 20580, andshall include a copy of the state's or private person's complaint and any other pleadings to be filedwith the court. If prior notice is not feasible, the state or private person shall serve the Commissionwith the required notice immediately upon instituting its action.(b) Nothing contained in this Section shall prohibit any attorney general or other authorized stateofficial from proceeding in state court on the basis of an alleged violation of any civil or criminalstatute of such state.
§ 310.8 Fee for access to the National Do Not Call Registry.(a) It is a violation of this Rule for any seller to initiate, or cause any telemarketer to initiate, anoutbound telephone call to any person whose telephone number is within a given area code unlesssuch seller, either directly or through another person, first has paid the annual fee, required by §310.8(c), for access to telephone numbers within that area code that are included in the National Do
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Not Call Registry maintained by the Commission under § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B); provided, however,that such payment is not necessary if the seller initiates, or causes a telemarketer to initiate, callssolely to persons pursuant to §§ 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B)(i) or (ii), and the seller does not access theNational Do Not Call Registry for any other purpose.(b) It is a violation of this Rule for any telemarketer, on behalf of any seller, to initiate an outboundtelephone call to any person whose telephone number is within a given area code unless that seller,either directly or through another person, first has paid the annual fee, required by § 310.8(c), foraccess to the telephone numbers within that area code that are included in the National Do Not CallRegistry; provided, however, that such payment is not necessary if the seller initiates, or causes atelemarketer to initiate, calls solely to persons pursuant to §§ 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B)(i) or (ii), and theseller does not access the National Do Not Call Registry for any other purpose.(c) The annual fee, which must be paid by any person prior to obtaining access to the National DoNot Call Registry, is $25 per area code of data accessed, up to a maximum of $7,375; provided,however, that there shall be no charge for the first five area codes of data accessed by any person,and provided further, that there shall be no charge to any person engaging in or causing others toengage in outbound telephone calls to consumers and who is accessing the National Do Not CallRegistry without being required under this Rule, 47 CFR 64.1200, or any other federal law. Anyperson accessing the National Do Not Call Registry may not participate in any arrangement to sharethe cost of accessing the registry, including any arrangement with any telemarketer or serviceprovider to divide the costs to access the registry among various clients of that telemarketer orservice provider.(d) After a person, either directly or through another person, pays the fees set forth in § 310.8(c), theperson will be provided a unique account number which will allow that person to access the registrydata for the selected area codes at any time for twelve months following the first day of the monthin which the person paid the fee ("the annual period"). To obtain access to additional area codes ofdata during the first six months of the annual period, the person must first pay $25 for eachadditional area code of data not initially selected. To obtain access to additional area codes of dataduring the second six months of the annual period, the person must first pay $15 for each additionalarea code of data not initially selected. The payment of the additional fee will permit the person toaccess the additional area codes of data for the remainder of the annual period.(e) Access to the National Do Not Call Registry is limited to telemarketers, sellers, others engagedin or causing others to engage in telephone calls to consumers, service providers acting on behalf ofsuch persons, and any government agency that has law enforcement authority. Prior to accessing theNational Do Not Call Registry, a person must provide the identifying information required by theoperator of the registry to collect the fee, and must certify, under penalty of law, that the person is accessing the registry solely to comply with theprovisions of this Rule or to otherwise prevent telephone calls to telephone numbers on the registry.If the person is accessing the registry on behalf of sellers, that person also must identify each of thesellers on whose behalf it is accessing the registry, must provide each seller's unique account numberfor access to the national registry, and must certify, under penalty of law, that the sellers will be using
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the information gathered from the registry solely to comply with the provisions of this Rule orotherwise to prevent telephone calls to telephone numbers on the registry.§ 310.9 Severability.The provisions of this Rule are separate and severable from one another. If any provision is stayedor determined to be invalid, it is the Commission's intention that the remaining provisions shallcontinue in effect.
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AMENDMENTS TO FCC RULES, 47 C.F.R. Parts 64 and 6868 Fed. Reg. 44177-79 (July 25, 2003)
Final Rules For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal Communications Commission amends parts64 and 68 of the Code of Federal Regulations as follows:PART 64--MISCELLANEOUS RULES RELATING TO COMMON CARRIERS1. The authority citation for part 64 continues to read: Authority: 47 U.S.C. 154, 254(k); secs. 403(b)(2)(B), (c), Public Law 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.Interpret or apply 47 U.S.C. 201, 218, 225, 226, 228, and 254(k) unless otherwise noted. 2. Subpart L is amended by revising the subpart heading to read as follows:* * * * * Subpart L--Restrictions on Telemarketing and Telephone Solicitation* * * * * 47 CFR § 64.1200 3. Section 64.1200 is revised to read as follows:47 CFR § 64.1200§ 64.1200 Delivery restrictions.(a) No person or entity may: (1) Initiate any telephone call (other than a call made for emergencypurposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using an automatic telephonedialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, (i) To any emergency telephone line, including any 911 line and any emergency line of a hospital,medical physician or service office, health care facility, poison control center, or fire protection orlaw enforcement agency; (ii) To the telephone line of any guest room or patient room of a hospital, health care facility, elderlyhome, or similar establishment; or (iii) To any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specializedmobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which the called partyis charged for the call.
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 (2) Initiate any telephone call to any residential line using an artificial or prerecorded voice todeliver a message without the prior express consent of the called party, unless the call, (i) Is made for emergency purposes, (ii) Is not made for a commercial purpose, (iii) Is made for a commercial purpose but does not include or introduce an unsolicitedadvertisement or constitute a telephone solicitation, (iv) Is made to any person with whom the caller has an established business relationship at the timethe call is made, or(v) Is made by or on behalf of a tax-exempt nonprofit organization. (3) Use a telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send an unsolicitedadvertisement to a telephone facsimile machine, (i) For purposes of paragraph (a)(3) of this section, a facsimile advertisement is not "unsolicited"if the recipient has granted the sender prior express invitation or permission to deliver theadvertisement, as evidenced by a signed, written statement that includes the facsimile number towhich any advertisements may be sent and clearly indicates the recipient's consent to receive suchfacsimile advertisements from the sender. (ii) A facsimile broadcaster will be liable for violations of paragraph (a)(3) of this section if itdemonstrates a high degree of involvement in, or actual notice of, the unlawful activity and fails totake steps to prevent such facsimile transmissions. (4) Use an automatic telephone dialing system in such a way that two or more telephone lines of amulti-line business are engaged simultaneously. (5) Disconnect an unanswered telemarketing call prior to at least 15 seconds or four (4) rings. (6) Abandon more than three percent of all telemarketing calls that are answered live by a person,measured over a 30-day period. A call is "abandoned" if it is not connected to a live salesrepresentative within two (2) seconds of the called person's completed greeting. Whenever a salesrepresentative is not available to speak with the person answering the call, that person must receive,within two (2) seconds after the called person's completed greeting, a prerecorded identificationmessage that states only the name and telephone number of the business, entity, or individual onwhose behalf the call was placed, and that the call was for "telemarketing purposes." The telephonenumber so provided must permit any individual to make a do-not- call request during regularbusiness hours for the duration of the telemarketing campaign. The telephone number may not bea 900 number or any other number for which charges exceed local or long distance transmissioncharges. The seller or telemarketer must maintain records establishing compliance with paragraph(a)(6) of this section. (i) A call for telemarketing purposes that delivers an artificial or prerecorded voice message to aresidential telephone line that is assigned to a person who either has granted prior express consentfor the call to be made or has an established business relationship with the caller shall not beconsidered an abandoned call if the message begins within two (2) seconds of the called person'scompleted greeting. (ii) Calls made by or on behalf of tax-exempt nonprofit organizations are not covered by paragraph(a)(6) of this section. (7) Use any technology to dial any telephone number for the purpose of determining whether theline is a facsimile or voice line.
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(b) All artificial or prerecorded telephone messages shall: (1) At the beginning of the message, state clearly the identity of the business, individual, or otherentity that is responsible for initiating the call. If a business is responsible for initiating the call, thename under which the entity is registered to conduct business with the State CorporationCommission (or comparable regulatory authority) must be stated, and (2) During or after the message, state clearly the telephone number (other than that of the autodialeror prerecorded message player that placed the call) of such business, other entity, *44178or individual. The telephone number provided may not be a 900 number or any other number forwhich charges exceed local or long distance transmission charges. For telemarketing messages toresidential telephone subscribers, such telephone number must permit any individual to make ado-not-call request during regular business hours for the duration of the telemarketing campaign. (c) No person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation, as defined in paragraph (f)(9) of thissection, to: (1) Any residential telephone subscriber before the hour of 8 a.m. or after 9 p.m. (local time at thecalled party's location), or (2) A residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on thenational do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that ismaintained by the federal government. Such do-not-call registrations must be honored for a periodof 5 years. Any person or entity making telephone solicitations (or on whose behalf telephonesolicitations are made) will not be liable for violating this requirement if: (i) It can demonstrate that the violation is the result of error and that as part of its routine businesspractice, it meets the following standards: (A) Written procedures. It has established and implemented written procedures to comply with thenational do-not-call rules; (B) Training of personnel. It has trained its personnel, and any entity assisting in its compliance, inprocedures established pursuant to the national do-not-call rules; (C) Recording. It has maintained and recorded a list of telephone numbers that the seller may notcontact; (D) Accessing the national do-not-call database. It uses a process to prevent telephone solicitationsto any telephone number on any list established pursuant to the do-not-call rules, employing aversion of the national do-not- call registry obtained from the administrator of the registry no morethan three months prior to the date any call is made, and maintains records documenting this process;and (E) Purchasing the national do-not-call database. It uses a process to ensure that it does not sell, rent,lease, purchase or use the national do-not-call database, or any part thereof, for any purpose exceptcompliance with this section and any such state or federal law to prevent telephone solicitations totelephone numbers registered on the national database. It purchases access to the relevant do-not-calldata from the administrator of the national database and does not participate in any arrangement toshare the cost of accessing the national database, including any arrangement with telemarketers whomay not divide the costs to access the national database among various client sellers; or (ii) It has obtained the subscriber's prior express invitation or permission. Such permission must beevidenced by a signed, written agreement between the consumer and seller which states that theconsumer agrees to be contacted by this seller and includes the telephone number to which the callsmay be placed; or (iii) The telemarketer making the call has a personal relationship with the recipient of the call.
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 (d) No person or entity shall initiate any call for telemarketing purposes to a residential telephonesubscriber unless such person or entity has instituted procedures for maintaining a list of personswho request not to receive telemarketing calls made by or on behalf of that person or entity. Theprocedures instituted must meet the following minimum standards: (1) Written policy. Persons or entities making calls for telemarketing purposes must have a writtenpolicy, available upon demand, for maintaining a do-not-call list. (2) Training of personnel engaged in telemarketing. Personnel engaged in any aspect oftelemarketing must be informed and trained in the existence and use of the do-not-call list. (3) Recording, disclosure of do-not-call requests. If a person or entity making a call fortelemarketing purposes (or on whose behalf such a call is made) receives a request from a residentialtelephone subscriber not to receive calls from that person or entity, the person or entity must recordthe request and place the subscriber's name, if provided, and telephone number on the do- not-calllist at the time the request is made. Persons or entities making calls for telemarketing purposes (oron whose behalf such calls are made) must honor a residential subscriber's do-not-call request withina reasonable time from the date such request is made. This period may not exceed thirty days fromthe date of such request. If such requests are recorded or maintained by a party other than the personor entity on whose behalf the telemarketing call is made, the person or entity on whose behalf thetelemarketing call is made will be liable for any failures to honor the do-not-call request. A personor entity making a call for telemarketing purposes must obtain a consumer's prior express permissionto share or forward the consumer's request not to be called to a party other than the person or entityon whose behalf a telemarketing call is made or an affiliated entity.(4) Identification of sellers and telemarketers. A person or entity making a call for telemarketingpurposes must provide the called party with the name of the individual caller, the name of the personor entity on whose behalf the call is being made, and a telephone number or address at which theperson or entity may be contacted. The telephone number provided may not be a 900 number or anyother number for which charges exceed local or long distance transmission charges. (5) Affiliated persons or entities. In the absence of a specific request by the subscriber to thecontrary, a residential subscriber's do-not-call request shall apply to the particular business entitymaking the call (or on whose behalf a call is made), and will not apply to affiliated entities unlessthe consumer reasonably would expect them to be included given the identification of the caller andthe product being advertised. (6) Maintenance of do-not-call lists. A person or entity making calls for telemarketing purposesmust maintain a record of a caller's request not to receive further telemarketing calls. A do-not-callrequest must be honored for 5 years from the time the request is made. (7) Tax-exempt nonprofit organizations are not required to comply with 64.1200(d). (e) The rules set forth in paragraph (c) and (d) of this section are applicable to any person or entitymaking telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers to the extentdescribed in the Commission's Report and Order, CG Docket No. 02-278, FCC 03-153, "Rules andRegulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991." (f) As used in this section: (1) The terms automatic telephone dialing system and autodialer mean equipment which has thecapacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called using a random or sequential numbergenerator and to dial such numbers. (2) The term emergency purposes means calls made necessary in any situation affecting the healthand safety of consumers.
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 (3) The term established business relationship means a prior or existing relationship formed by avoluntary two-way communication between a person or entity and a residential subscriber with orwithout an exchange of consideration, on the basis of the subscriber's purchase or transaction *44179with the entity within the eighteen (18) months immediately preceding the date of the telephone callor on the basis of the subscriber's inquiry or application regarding products or services offered bythe entity within the three months immediately preceding the date of the call, which relationship hasnot been previously terminated by either party. (i) The subscriber's seller-specific do-not-call request, as set forth in paragraph (d)(3) of this section,terminates an established business relationship for purposes of telemarketing and telephonesolicitation even if the subscriber continues to do business with the seller. (ii) The subscriber's established business relationship with a particular business entity does notextend to affiliated entities unless the subscriber would reasonably expect them to be included giventhe nature and type of goods or services offered by the affiliate and the identity of the affiliate. (4) The term facsimile broadcaster means a person or entity that transmits messages to telephonefacsimile machines on behalf of another person or entity for a fee. (5) The term seller means the person or entity on whose behalf a telephone call or message isinitiated for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods,or services, which is transmitted to any person. (6) The term telemarketer means the person or entity that initiates a telephone call or message forthe purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or services,which is transmitted to any person. (7) The term telemarketing means the initiation of a telephone call or message for the purpose ofencouraging the purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or services, which istransmitted to any person. (8) The term telephone facsimile machine means equipment which has the capacity to transcribe textor images, or both, from paper into an electronic signal and to transmit that signal over a regulartelephone line, or to transcribe text or images (or both) from an electronic signal received over aregular telephone line onto paper. (9) The term telephone solicitation means the initiation of a telephone call or message for thepurpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or services,which is transmitted to any person, but such term does not include a call or message: (i) To any person with that person's prior express invitation or permission; (ii) To any person with whom the caller has an established business relationship; or (iii) By or on behalf of a tax-exempt nonprofit organization. (10) The term unsolicited advertisement means any material advertising the commercial availabilityor quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person'sprior express invitation or permission. (11) The term personal relationship means any family member, friend, or acquaintance of thetelemarketer making the call. (g) Beginning January 1, 2004, common carriers shall: (1) When providing local exchange service, provide an annual notice, via an insert in thesubscriber's bill, of the right to give or revoke a notification of an objection to receiving telephonesolicitations pursuant to the national do-not-call database maintained by the federal government andthe methods by which such rights may be exercised by the subscriber. The notice must be clear and
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conspicuous and include, at a minimum, the Internet address and toll-free number that residentialtelephone subscribers may use to register on the national database. (2) When providing service to any person or entity for the purpose of making telephone solicitations,make a one-time notification to such person or entity of the national do-not-call requirements,including, at a minimum, citation to 47 CFR 64.1200 and 16 CFR 310. Failure to receive suchnotification will not serve as a defense to any person or entity making telephone solicitations fromviolations of this section. (h) The administrator of the national do-not-call registry that is maintained by the federalgovernment shall make the telephone numbers in the database available to the States so that a Statemay use the telephone numbers that relate to such State as part of any database, list or listing systemmaintained by such State for the regulation of telephone solicitations.47 CFR § 64.16014. Section 64.1601 is amended by adding paragraph (e) to read as follows:47 CFR § 64.1601§ 64.1601 Delivery requirements and privacy restrictions.* * * * *  (e) Any person or entity that engages in telemarketing, as defined in section 64.1200(f)(7) musttransmit caller identification information. (1) For purposes of this paragraph, caller identification information must include either CPN orANI, and, when available by the telemarketer's carrier, the name of the telemarketer. It shall not bea violation of this paragraph to substitute (for the name and phone number used in, or billed for,making the call) the name of the seller on behalf of which the telemarketing call is placed and theseller's customer service telephone number. The telephone number so provided must permit anyindividual to make a do-not-call request during regular business hours. (2) Any person or entity that engages in telemarketing is prohibited from blocking the transmissionof caller identification information. (3) Tax-exempt nonprofit organizations are not required to comply with this paragraph.
PART 68--CONNECTION OF TERMINAL EQUIPMENT TO THE TELEPHONE NETWORK 5. The authority citation for part 68 continues to read: Authority: 47 U.S.C. 154, 303.47 CFR § 68.318 6. Section 68.318 is amended by revising paragraph (d) to read as follows:47 CFR § 68.318
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§ 68.318 Additional limitations.* * * * *  (d) Telephone facsimile machines; Identification of the sender of the message. It shall be unlawfulfor any person within the United States to use a computer or other electronic device to send anymessage via a telephone facsimile machine unless such person clearly marks, in a margin at the topor bottom of each transmitted page of the message or on the first page of the transmission, the dateand time it is sent and an identification of the business, other entity, or individual sending themessage and the telephone number of the sending machine or of such business, other entity, orindividual. If a facsimile broadcaster demonstrates a high degree of involvement in the sender'sfacsimile messages, such as supplying the numbers to which a message is sent, that broadcaster'sname, under which it is registered to conduct business with the State Corporation Commission (orcomparable regulatory authority), must be identified on the facsimile, along with the sender's name.Telephone facsimile machines manufactured on and after December 20, 1992, must clearly marksuch identifying information on each transmitted page.* * * * * [FR Doc. 03-18766 Filed 7-24-03; 8:45 am]
